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Techniques of performance-based design in fire safety have developed notably in the 
past two decades. One of the reasons for departing from the prescriptive methods is 
the ability of performance-based methods to form a scientific basis for the cost-risk-
benefit analysis of different fire safety alternatives. Apart from few exceptions, 
observation of past fires has shown that the structure’s contribution to the overall fire 
resistance was considerably underestimated. 
 
The purpose of this research is to outline a risk-based design approach for structures 
in fire. Probabilistic methods are employed to ascertain uniform reliability indices in 
line with the classical trend in code development. 
  
Modern design codes for complex phenomena such as fire have been structured to 
facilitate design computations. Prescriptive design methods specify fire protection 
methods for structural systems based on laboratory controlled and highly restrictive 
testing regimes. Those methods inherently assume that the tested elements behave 
similarly in real structures irrespective of their loading, location or boundary 
conditions. This approach is contested by many researchers, and analyses following 
fire incidents indicated alarming discrepancy between anticipated and actual 
structural behaviour during real fires. 
 
In formulating design and construction codes, code writers deal with the inherent 
uncertainties by setting a ceiling to the potential risk of failure. The latter process is 
implemented by specifying safety parameters, that are derived via probabilistic 
techniques aimed at harmonising the risks ensuing different load scenarios. The code 
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
 h
structure addresses the probability of failure with adequate detail and accuracy. The 
other component of the risk metric, namely the consequence of failure, is a subjective 
field that assumes a multitude of variables depending on the context of the problem. 
In codified structural design, the severity of failure is implicitly embodied in the 
different magnitudes of safety indices applied to different modes of structural 
response. 
 
This project introduces a risk-based method for the design of structures in fire. It 
provides a coherent approach to a quantified treatment of risk elements that meets the 
demands of performance-based fire safety methods.  
 
A number of proposals are made for rational acceptable risk and reliability 
parameters in addition to a damage index with applications in structural fire safety 
design. Although the example application of the proposed damage index is a 
structure subjected to fire effects, the same rationale can be easily applied to the 
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This project introduces a risk-based method for the design of structures in fire. It 
provides a coherent approach to a quantified treatment of risk elements that meets the 
demands of performance-based fire safety methods.  
 
During the past two decades, the subject of structural response to fire gained 
unprecedented momentum.  Interest among the research community in the UK 
surged markedly following Broadgate fire in 1990 [10], an incident that came to 
expose the lagging status of fire research in structural engineering. The extensive 
investigation that followed Broadgate suggested that the structural behaviour in fire 
was not adequately understood. Together with other building fires as well as large 
full-scale fire tests in Australia and Germany, Broadgate provided motivation for the 
landmark Cardington test at the Building Research Establishment (BRE) Laboratory 
in Cardington. Evidence from the Cardington test provided a valuable database for 
increased research activity in structural fire engineering. 
 
The time-honoured prescriptive methods for fire protection showed alarming 
inconsistency with regards to the performance of structures in real fires. While the 
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structure performed beyond expectation in the case of Broadgate, it failed tragically 
in the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. All WTC buildings as well as 
Broadgate were designed using prescriptive methods that deemed to satisfy the 
relevant building regulations. With the advent of revolutionary forms in architecture, 
design for fire is becoming increasingly challenging. 
 
Additionally, the considerable volume of research work in structural response to fire 
requires an organisational platform to extract practical design methods. The presence 
of a directive environment should help channel the efforts of researchers and 
regulators towards meaningful fire safety solutions. As part of this project, a 
quantitative parameter for assessing disproportionate collapse associated with the 
localised nature of fire is proposed. The damage index can be incorporated into the 
risk metric to provide a quantified risk estimate. Although the general treatment 
focuses on the design of structures for fire conditions, it retains a broad spectrum and 
can be adopted for other loading types. 
 
This thesis builds on the recent advancement in fire safety engineering applications, 
revisiting the architecture of approach and introducing a rational treatment based on 
performance-based design. The relationship between fire, structural engineers as well 
as clients takes a far more interactive shape than ever; an interaction that is more of 
need than of novelty. 
 
The methodologies presented herein provide the engineering community with a 
design tool that enables extended freedom in selecting or developing fire-resisting 
systems whilst maintaining uniform safety levels. The design of structures can be 
calibrated to meet a performance criterion by a trade-off between “systems”  and 
“systems-reliability” . The acceptance criterion is straightforward: the risk associated 
with failure is equal for all conceivable failures.  
 
In current codes, certain modes of failure, such as in yielding, are preferred to other 
modes, owing to the development of such failures over longer periods of time. This 
Introduction 
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is the reason for specifying higher target safety indices to unfavourable failure modes 
in an attempt to instigate potential failure in more favourable modes. The selection of 
the different safety indices, however, is subjective and based on the behaviour of 
individual members rather than that of the whole structure. Despite the success of the 
codes, examples can be drawn from actual practice where the code intent is easily 
contravened, as is shown in chapter 5. 
 
The implementation of quantitative risk assessment in design codes requires a 
holistic treatment of structures wherein different members assume different damage 
indices related to how their failure affects the global structure. A proposal for such 
index is presented in chapter 6. 
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Chapter  2: Per formance-Based Design 
 
The evolution of industrial economies necessitated the development of standard 
practices. Standardisation provided the industry with uniform performance standards, 
but created considerable bureaucratic barriers to innovation. Fire engineering is one 
example where the industry is governed by standard tests and specifications that in 
many cases do not relate to the problems they are intended to solve. 
 
Designers as well economists have realised the need to depart from rigid prescriptive 
requirements to more rational solutions that are tailored to the objectives of the 
design. It is also essential to develop quantitative models of the performance of fire 
safety systems that may be incorporated in decision formulae. 
 
Performance-based is objective-based design. A discussion of the common fire safety 
objectives along with analysis and verification tools is presented. The rationale of 
performance-based design is open to deterministic and probabilistic models. 
Probability-based models however offer a basic component the quantitative risk 
assessment which is the logical approach for decision making in performance-based 
design. A number of decision methodologies are duly described. 
 
The achievement of safety during fire is accomplished by integrated systems of fire 
safety products and installations, in addition to the naturally-existing capacity of the 
structure. The common objective of safety systems is providing sufficient time for 
evacuation and for retention of structural capacity until fire extinction. A three-tier 
reliability index system can meet the different functional requirements of the 







Chapter  3: Risk Analysis 
 
Design is essentially a plan for the future. The uncertainties surrounding future 
demands and capacities create an environment of risk. 
 
The focus of the design is to minimise potential losses that may arise from projected 
influences. The process is a balance between the two main components of the risk: 
probability of an event and its consequence. 
 
The analysis of risk involves a significant number of social parameters that cannot be 
described in a crisp manner. Engineering projects on the other hand, require 
quantitative analysis that enables comparison and ranking of design options. The 
arrival at fit-for-purpose engineering solution must account for societal expectations, 
but should be carried out within the correct context. A number of risk assessment 
criteria are described.  
 
Consistency in design can be achieved by unifying risk of events influencing the 
structure. The chapter present a simple formula for unified acceptable risk. 
 
 
Chapter  4: Safety and Reliability Engineer ing 
 
Gauss showed that “ the mean of reported locations may be thought of as the true 
position, because an unbiased measurement taken by an unbiased observer is just as 
likely to be slightly above as slightly below the true value.”  [11] 
 
Design is based on predictions for both demand and capacity. Both are projected in 
the future surrounded by an array of blurring uncertainties. 
 
Uncertainty is encountered by extra allowances and margins that are intended to 
offset its effect. Risk is a function of the uncertainty and consequence of an event. 
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For unfavourable events, safety is the opposite of risk; hence safety factors that do 
not account for uncertainties are meaningless. 
 
Uncertainty modelling and reliability techniques are introduced. The main focus of 
the chapter is level II reliability methods due to its wide application and reasonable 
computational demand. 
 
Structural behaviour in fire is inherently nonlinear and potentially dynamic if local or 
global collapse ensues. The implications of applying level I reliability methods to 
structural fire design are assessed, especially with regards to converting fire and the 
corresponding structural response to time-invariant variables. 
 
Two proposals are made at the end of the chapter. One is for a risk-based target 
reliability index, which fits well within the framework of performance-based design. 
The second is for an optimisation method to calculate the reliability index that is 
capable of detecting multiple design points. 
 
 
Chapter  5: L imit State Design in Practical Situations: I s your  structure 
safe enough? 
 
The chapter provides a brief introduction to system reliability and analyses the 
relationship between the failure of members and the global structures for different 
system types. The reliability of series, parallel, redundant and damaged systems is 
introduced. 
 
The formulation for level I reliability method is member-based. Examples of 
standard design practice are give to illustrate the impact of ignoring system 
reliability. Recommendations are made in the aim of improving reliability in 





Chapter  6: The Strength Loss Method 
 
Current design codes are based on reliability. The reliability or safety indices which 
form the basis of design formulas are derived such that target probabilities of failure 
are not exceeded. 
 
The risk associated with different modes of failure (buckling or yielding for 
example) is treated subjectively by specifying different reliability indices to 
respective modes. This approach holds for the design of isolated members and if 
member sizes are optimised. In actual practice, the failure of members of the same 
failure modes, such as columns, may have significantly different impact on the whole 
structure. A simple example could be the failure of a column in the ground or tenth 
storey of a 15 storey building. 
 
In the most advanced codes, the treatment of failure is confined to predominantly 
prescriptive measures to prevent disproportionate collapse. These provisions do not 
require consideration of the characteristics of the specific structure and their 
adequacy cannot be verified by calculation. More importantly, there exists no 
quantitative damage parameters that permit the computation of the risk associated 
with failure. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a formulation for a global damage index that can be used to 
quantitatively assess the effect of damage on a structure; hence it is suitable for 
application in performance-based designs. An example is given for a multi-storey 
structure under fire. 
 
Chapter  7: Conclusions and Recommendations for  Fur ther  Research 
 
In addition to emphasising the key messages of the thesis, the final chapter points out 
in the direction of promising developments related to this research. It includes a 
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
 8 
proposal for the development of a level I structural fire code, FiRel (Fire Reliability 
Calculation); a programme for reliability calculation for structural performance in 
fire using response surface modelling and the use of the strength loss method in the 
design of structures for fire following earthquakes. 
 
Like any other work, this thesis has built on a vast amount of previous high quality 
research. It is hoped that it would complement existing knowledge and serve as 


























Performance-based design (PBD) is not new to civilisation [12]. Two examples of 
PBD follow. 
 
Case 1:  When a tailor designs a shirt for a customer, he starts by taking the 
customer’s measurements. Next he displays different textile materials, buttons, 
threads and designs. Both the tailor and the customer discuss the cost of making the 
shirt. Occasionally, the customer argues that a certain textile is expensive, but the 
tailor explains that the shirt would not need ironing and should last longer if that 
material is selected. The deal succeeds if they both agree on design and price. 
 
Case 2:  Mass-producing workshops have a different view. For cheaper and faster 
production, generic sizes are taken. The available sizes would depend on the 
frequency distribution of relevant sizes in the target market. Deemed to satisfy 
patterns are used, and all what the worker in the workshop has to do is use the right 
Performance-Based Design 
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pattern to cut the shape, use a specified textile and buttons. Everything should work, 
without having to think about it.  
 
Case 1 is a true example of performance-based design. The objective is set around 
specific requirements (taking the actual customer’s measurements reduces the 
uncertainty in the shirt size). The reliability of various design alternatives are 
assessed in view of benefit and cost (different materials are available, however, the 
tailor feels that the running cost of maintenance (ironing) and the risk of faster 
depreciation of the investment (cheap textiles fade quicker) outweigh the saving in 
the initial cost).  Reliability is sustained; the probability that the tailor makes a 
mistake in designing two different shirts for two different customers is small and 
generally decreases with time and experience. Moreover, the continued interaction 
during the design and execution process provides a channel for modification and 
refinement. 
 
Case 2 is a compromise of case 1. The objective is compromised; the specific sizes 
are unknown but the produced sizes are thought to fit most people. The alternatives 
are limited and fixed, x number of models with y number of textiles. The reliability is 
unknown! People may like certain designs or materials and not others, and the 
manufacturer does not speak to the user.  This case is a typical example of 
prescriptive design.  
 
It is worth noting, however, that prescriptive designs provide cheaper and time-
saving alternatives with little need for specialist expertise. 
 
Figure 2.1 analyses two alternatives in terms of rationale and possible consequences. 
It contrasts informed risk assessment based on calculated prognosis to uninformed 
decision making.  







Q.2: Can non-vision related medical problems be 
detected and would they affect the test result? 
Q.3: What are my options and how reliable are they? 
Q.1: Would the person’s height or position affect 
the test? What if the examinee is long-sighted? 
2.   I would say 50cm is 
more or less this much; 
now let’s have a look: can I 
read the one below it? My 
eyes are killing me. 
1. Examinee is always seated with head 
positioned at a measured distance from the 
reference device point. The examination is 
by a qualified person. 
1. Yes 
2. No 
1. Laser surgery or custom- made spectacles 
– Life-cycle-cost vs. benefit well-defined 
2. Generic off-the-shelf spectacles – might 
or might not work! 
Figure 2.1      Shopping for Spectacles 
 
Q.4: Success rate? 





2.1 Elements of Performance-Based Design 
 
The three main components of Performance-Based design (PBD) are: 
 
 Definition of the design objectives 
 Investigation of the alternative designs available to meet the objectives 
 An informed decision making process utilising reliability and risk assessment 
of alternatives as tools to select the most efficient solution. 
 
Prescriptive design could be considered as one form of PBD, with some concessions 
in the above three criteria. The objectives are mostly generic and not job-specific, the 
alternatives are pre-set and limited, and the reliability analysis is almost completely 
missing. A generic procedure for performance-based design is outlined in figure 2.2. 
 
 
Set the objectives of the design by: 
•  Client 
•  Design Regulation Authorities 
  A feasibility study is produced outlining 
the various alternatives and the optimum 
solution derived from a clear ranking 
decision criteria.  
Is the outcome of the feasibility 
study acceptable by the Client and 
Design Regulation Authorities? 
 
Explore alternative designs 
Figure-2.2  Generic Flowchart of Performance-Based Design Process 
  Design team to investigate the 
qualifying solutions, using 
 
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
- Benefit-Risk-Cost analysis 
 
Design team to explore a 
number of available solutions 
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2.2 Why Performance-Based Design? 
 
The motivation behind performance-based design for structural fire safety 
engineering is twofold. The engineering community has realised the inadequacy of 
prescriptive techniques by evidence of recent failures, including the collapse of the 
twin towers in New York in September 2001. The problem is compounded by the 
inability to relate performance of structural elements in real fires to the code-
approved ratings and fire protection measures. 
 
The other side of the story relates to the restrictions placed on industry, especially 
with regards to innovation. New technologies have to undergo series of standardised 
tests, which are neither cheap nor provide any insight on how systems may be 
improved. This realisation was reflected in the World Trade Organisation Agreement 
on Technical Barriers on Trade (clause 2.8) which encourages members to “specify 
technical regulations based on product requirements in terms of performance rather 
than design or prescriptive characteristics [13].”   
 
Performance-based framework encourages a wider range of alternatives that support 
optimisation of project cost and resources. More importantly, it facilitates better 
understanding of the impact of fire protection solutions on the actual fire safety 
objectives. 
 
2.3 Performance-based design in Fire 
 
Focus on performance-based design (PBD) for fire safety has grown rapidly over the 
past two decades. The adoption of the approach, whether called performance-based 
or objective-oriented, has evolved in marked changes in regulations in many 
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countries. Starting in the UK and Japan in mid 1980’s and Australia in the late 
1980’s, the approach is gaining greater acceptance and its application is growing on 
an international scale. 
 
Whether applied to fire safety engineering or in any other contexts, the principles of 
PBD do not change: quantitative assessment of design alternatives that meet the job-
specific objectives is the main approach. In fire safety engineering, the procedure of 
design is as follows: 
 
1. Required performance of output variable: Identification of the project 
specific needs in terms of fire safety and definition of the design objectives. 
2. Input variables: Selection of the most realistic fire scenarios  
3. Prospective output variables: Determination of the various design 
alternatives achieving the objectives for every fire scenario. 
4. Balance formula: Quantitative assessment of the design alternatives on the 
basis of Benefit-Risk-Cost comparison. This step has so far been performed 
by deterministic approaches. Extension to a probabilistic formulation is 
computationally cumbersome but is feasible. 
 
2.3.1 Objectives of Fire Safety Engineering 
 
There most certainly exists a consensus on the key objectives of fire safety design. 
These has been summarised in CIB Report: “Rational Fire Safety Engineering 
Approach to Fire Resistance of Buildings”  as follows [14]: 
 
1. Protection of health and safety, that of the building occupants and of the fire-
fighter’s in addition to other people in the vicinity who might be affected by the 
spread of fire or smoke. 
2. Protection of property, by minimising damage to structure and fabric, 
safeguarding property and preserving public image. 
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3. Protection of the environment, by mitigating the impact of gaseous, liquid and 
solid waste. 
4. Protection of architectural, historic and cultural value 
5. Protection of infrastructure. This is particular to buildings with broad functional 
activities, such as telecommunication towers or public internet servers, where 
the cost of interruption exceeds the direct fire damage by many orders of 
magnitude. 
 
2.3.2 Fire Safety Strategy 
 
The main phenomena that pose risk to safety, and hence compromise the above 
objectives are [14]: propagation of smoke and gases within the building or to 
adjacent spaces, fire spread within the building and structural failure particularly if it 
initiates progressive collapse. 
 
The above conditions set the demand on design alternatives and thereby stipulate 
respective failure modes or limit states.  The aim of fire safety design is to engineer a 
satisfactory performance for the building whereby capacity exceeds demand by an 
acceptable margin. 
 
The principal limit states applicable to building fire safety engineering are: 
 
 Smoke Leakage 
 Thermal Insulation 
 Integrity 
 Load bearing capacity 
 
Smoke is the main killer in most building fires. In addition to toxicity and visibility 
impairment, smoke propagating at high temperature can initiate fire beyond the 
compartment of origin. Smoke damage assumes the larger proportion of repair cost 
as compared to heat-related damage [15]. To mitigate the risk of developing 
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untenable conditions or ignition in adjacent spaces, walls and floors of the fire 
compartment must possess adequate thermal insulation. Most standard fire tests 
define an upper limit of the temperature rise on the cold side; for example: in the 
standard BS 476 fire test, 140 oC average and 180 oC maximum at any one point 
[15]. Integrity of the fire enclosure can be compromised by cracking failure of 
special fire sealants which allows heat and smoke to infiltrate to adjacent areas. 
Load-bearing capacity addresses the two main criteria of ultimate limit state and 
serviceability as appropriate. Excessive deflection hampers rescue operations and can 
result in serious damage to compartment walls or floors. Design must ensure that 
structural elements continue to carry applied loads in the variety of mechanisms 
developing throughout fire. In particular, the probability of structural failure 
initiating beyond the origin of fire or progressive collapse must be kept low. 
 
One distinction between the above limit states is that their relevance to design 
follows the temporal evolution of fire. The most obvious example is that the effect on 
the structure becomes significant only in the post-flashover stage. This property is a 
powerful tool in the development of design alternatives. Using a quantified risk 
parameter, design optimisation can be performed through a trade-off that can easily 
be established between active and passive fire protection systems. 
 
Limit states are merely surrogate formulations that serve to formalise design 
procedures. This important fact must always be remembered, especially when special 
projects are at hand. In some cases, conventional limit states may fall short of 
capturing all potential critical conditions in which case designers need to revert to ad-
hoc design methods. Nuclear facilities, historic buildings and communication centres 
are a few examples. Table 2.1 contains a brief summary of risk control criteria in 
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Table 2.1:  The Fire Safety System – Subsystems &  Possible Measures 
(Reproduced from [16]) 





Control of fire initiation and 
development in early stages 
•  Earth leakage 
devices 
•  Surveillance systems 
•  Materials of 
construction 
•  Alarm and detection 
systems plus hose 
reels and 
extinguishers 
•  Sprinklers 
•  Other automatic fire 
suppression 
hardware 
•  Regular maintenance of 
electrical and mechanical 
systems 
•  Human monitoring of 
surveillance systems 
•  Presence of occupants within 
the building 
•  Presence of occupants trained 
in early fire fighting in 
building 
•  Management and maintenance 
of alarm and detection 
systems 
•  Maintenance of hose reels and 
extinguishers 
•  Management and maintenance 
of sprinkler systems 
Control of flame spread •  Physical barriers 
•  Materials of 
construction 
including linings 
•  Alarm and detection 
systems plus fire 
brigade 
•  Maintenance of barriers 
•  Management and maintenance 
of alarm and detection 
systems 
Control of spread of smoke 
and toxic products 
•  Physical barriers 
•  Smoke exhaust 
systems (purging) 
•  Pressurization 
systems (e.g., stairs 
or zones) 
•  Maintenance of barriers 
•  Management and maintenance 
of Smoke exhaust and 
pressurization systems 
Provision of means to allow 
occupant avoidance 
•  Signage 
•  Exits 
•  Presence of trained wardens 
•  Evacuation drills 
Provision of structural 
adequacy 
•  Size of structural 
members 
•  Overall structural 
behaviour 
•  Fire protective 
coatings, concrete 
cover 




2.4 Quantitative Assessment of Fire Safety Design 
 
2.4.1  The Risk Triangle 
  
Risk has three main aspects: event, consequences and context [17]. Failure of a 
building under the event of an earthquake, wind, fire or any load is a risk. The 
consequences of failure play a major part in risk assessment. Although the 
probability of an earthquake with an intensity of 8.0 degrees on the Richter scale is 
quite low, the consequences can be catastrophic. Codes have sometimes assigned, 
though implicitly, risk-related factors to some loads, especially where buildings 
housed a large number of people or for hospital and emergency buildings. An 
example of those is the importance factor for wind loads in the United States. 
Response of people to the consequences of an event is paramount to design. 
Although death is an indisputable certainty, perception for death in a fire is far 
different from that in a car accident. The impact of a large toll of fatalities in a single 
incident is far greater than to the same number over a number of accidents. Finally, 
by context, we mean who is preparing the assessment, for whom and for what 
purpose. Compromising the environment is a typical example of most development 
schemes. The argument suggests that the benefit of creating jobs outweighs the loss 
due to health problems, while obviously, assigning a monetary value for health. 
 
Structures can fail in more than one way. Failure is the state where the structural 
resistance falls below the load effects. Different failure modes have different 
probabilities and consequences depending on factors such as those listed below. 
  
1. Probability of load occurrence (dead, live, wind, fire, etc.) 
2. Type of load (static, dynamic, cyclic, time-dependent like creep)                                                
3. Relative magnitude of the load 
4. Response of the structure to the load (sway, cracking, vibration, falling glass, 
collapse) 
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5. Mode of structural response (sudden like brittle fracture or buckling, or 
prolonged like yielding, , excessive deflection) 
6. Human response to the load and consequences (panic in fires and nuclear attacks, 
discomfort to floor vibration) 
7. Cost versus benefit in reducing the probability of event occurrence.  
8. Cost of remedial action 
9. Acceptable failure rate.  
 
The first three factors represent the event, the next three the consequences and the 
last three the context. 
 
To increase the chances of obtaining an accurate analysis, consideration should be 
given to the following points. 
 
 Understanding the System: Components of the system are the constituents of 
the demand-capacity formula (loads, material behaviour, structural integrity) 
and attributes affected by its performance (human lives, environment, 
economy). 
 
 Establishing a representative model of the system for the risk study: This 
includes the identification of basic variables and their uncertainties. The 
basic variables in structural engineering could be the structure and loads, 
human factors and a careful examination of previous failures and successes. 
Attention should be given to uncertainties in material properties, section 
dimensions, connections relative stiffness, the computational model for the 
structure and loads, uncertainty in statistical modelling, fabrication 




 Identification of relationship between design variables, such as the interaction 
of failure modes. How would certain failures affect the whole structure, or 
adjacent structures? Event Trees are valuable instruments in this respect. 
 
 
2.5  Statistical Decision Theory 
 
Decision makers are often faced with the prospect of choosing the design approach to 
the project at hand. Inherent in the decision process is the uncertainty surrounding 
the success or failure of the design attributes within the economic context. The 
technicalities of design are handled by the design team and are of no material interest 
to stakeholders.  
 
Statistical decision theory provides a viable ranking tool to extract gain or loss 
indices from design options [18]. Subsets of the latter are payoff analysis, Hurwicz 
and Bayes’  criteria and utility theory.  
 
By constructing a payoff table, decision makers are presented with quantified 
expected values for profit or loss that incorporate the effects of uncertainty.  
 
Table 2.2:   Typical Payoff Table 
Events, Ei 
Decisions, Dj E1 E2 E3 ………… En 
D1 C11 C12 C13 …………. C1n 
D2 C21 C22 C23 …………. C2n 
D3 C31 C32 C33 ………….. C3n 
….. ………. ………… ………… …………. …….. 
Dn Cn1 Cn2 Cn3 ………… Cnn 
 
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
21 
In the above table, Cij represents the payoff or consequence of decision Dj should 
event Ei take place. The matrix form of the above table and a graphical 
representation by a tree diagram are depicted in figure 2.3. 
 
 
A number of different criteria can be applied to arrive at a decision based on payoff 
tables. These include the maximax, maximin, minimax, Hurwicz and Bayes’  criteria 
[18, 19]. The maximax (maximum of maxima) criterion represents the largest, or 





































































Maximin (maximum of minima) selects the maximum value of the row containing 
minimum payoff corresponding to any one event (or row), Ei, i.e.; max [min [Cij, 
Ei]], i = 1,2,…,n. To apply the minimax criterion, a regret matrix (also referred to as 
opportunity loss) is first constructed from the difference between the maximum 
payoff, Ci_max, and other payoffs corresponding to an event, Ei. For each row 
corresponding to event Ei, this difference stands for the loss associated with 
decisions Di to Dn. A column of the maximum regret of each row is constructed and 
the optimum decision opts for the minimum value thereof (minimum of regret 
maxima), that is min [max [ (Ci_max - Ci_max), Ei ]. 
 
Table 2.3a:   Payoff Table based on Maximax (most optimistic) criteria 
Events, Ei 





D1 C11 C12 C13 …… C1n Max [C1j] 
D2 C21 C22 C23 …… C2n Max [C2j] 
D3 C31 C32 C33 …… C3n Max [C3j] 
….. …… …… …… …… … …… 
Dn Cn1 Cn2 Cn3 …… Cnn Max [Cnj]  
 
 
Table 2.3b:   Payoff Table based on Maximin (most pessimistic) criteria 
Events, Ei 





D1 C11 C12 C13 …… C1n Min [C1j] 
D2 C21 C22 C23 …… C2n Min [C2j] 
D3 C31 C32 C33 …… C3n Min [C3j] 
….. …… …… …… …… … …… 
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Table 2.3c:   Payoff Table based on Minimax (least regret) criteria 
Events, Ei 





D1 C11 C12 C13 …… C1n C1j_max –C1j 
D2 C21 C22 C23 …… C2n C2j_max –C2j 
D3 C31 C32 C33 …… C3n C3j_max –C2j 
….. …… …… …… …… … …… 
Dn Cn1 Cn2 Cn3 …… Cnn Cnj_max –Cnj  
 
 
A forward development of the above criteria enables the design alternatives to be 
analysed in terms of payoff and the associated reliability. 
 
Risk is a function of probability of an event and its consequence. Assuming that both 
the probability and the consequence are of the same order, it can be liberally defined 
as the product of probability and consequence of an event. 
 
 








    (2.1) 
 
 
By applying Hurwicz or Bayes’  criterion [18], prior (or subjective) probabilities, pr-i, 
are superimposed on the payoff table to deduce weighted averages or expected 
values for the risk, R, associated with decision, D. The probability, pr-i, is the 










































































































jiirpriorij DCpR   (2.3) 
 
The optimum decision (also called the optimal act), Dj-optimum ,  is the one with the 
most desirable (minimum or maximum) consequence or utility; that is: 
 
          [ ]priorijpriorijjoptimumj RorRDD −−− == maxmin:                          (2.3-a) 
 
Minimum or maximum values indicate a negative or positive risk representing an 
opportunity loss or payoff respectively. Since the probabilities attached to the events 
are subjective, the expected value of risk, priorijR − , in the above formula is the 
expected value of risk under uncertainty. 
 
2.6 Performance-Based or Prescriptive design? 
 
Is it worth spending time and money to carry out a higher order analysis? This 
question is often posed to the design team. 
 
Economists frequently use the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) as a 
parameter to estimate the benefit gained from further investigation [18, 19]. Given 
perfect information, the client always opts for optimal acts, and the prior 
probabilities, pr-i, are interpreted as relative frequencies or weight-values, wi,. 
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Therefore, the risk with perfect information is calculated as the union of 
probabilities: 
 




unchanged) are iesprobabilitprior  of (values  iri pw −=  
 
The above equation resembles the hypothetical case where the client makes the same 
decision when faced by the same problem an infinite number of times. 
 
The EVPI can then be calculated as the difference between the risk (gain or loss) 
with perfect information and the expected value of risk under uncertainty. 
 
 
              priorijninformatioperfectij RREVPI −− −=                        (2.4-a) 
 
 
The EVPI sets the upper bound on expenditure related to gaining further knowledge 
through sampling information, whether experimental or via simulation. 
 
In fire safety engineering design, EVPI can be used to aid the decision whether to 
adopt prescriptive or performance-based design. Prescriptive solutions intrinsically 
yield designs under uncertainty. The life-cycle-cost of each prescriptive solution is 
evaluated under a number of fire scenarios (single-floor, severe multi-storey fire, 
etc.). Prior probabilities are assigned to each scenario and the risk is calculated under 
uncertainty and with perfect information. The EVPI (or EVSI discussed in the next 
section) is the maximum cost including design fee that the client should pay for 
performance-based design. It is imperative to remember that the cost must include 
provision for the value of human life so as to account for fatalities or injuries. Values 
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and models for the frequencies of occurrence in addition to reliability of fire-
protection systems can be found in references [16, 20]. 
 
2.7 Bayes’  Criterion 
 
Bayes’  theory provides a tool for analysing prospective decisions in a multistage 
manner. The initial stage utilises prior analysis and mimics Hurwicz criterion. The 
second stage, the pre-posterior analysis, is an upward refinement of prior 
probabilities. Yet again it assigns subjective probabilities to events but these are 
based on past information about similar problems. 
 
It is especially beneficial when statistical information is limited and needs to be 
supplemented by value judgement and intuition in order to infer the probability of an 
event from sample observations. 
 
As discussed in the above section, the value of EVPI is calculated on the 
presumption that an infinite number of samples have been assessed. In other words, 
the uncertainty inherent into inferring from a sample to the target population is 
nullified. EVPI is true if, and only if, the full range of events has been examined. 
This is almost impossible in practical terms. 
 
Pre-posterior analysis enables the calculation of a point estimate of EVPI, namely the 
value of sample information, EVSI. As it might have already been concluded, EVSI 
embodies estimates of events derived from existing previous sample surveys. In the 
payoff calculation, prior probabilities are replaced by the conditional probability of 
the estimates, Xj, given that the event, Ei, is the true state of affairs, ( )ij EXp . To 
illustrate, a consultant may give the following advice to the client regarding fire load 
in an office: 
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Based on the surveys we carried out over a number of years, we estimate the 
following probabilities of a high fire load: 
 
 A 30% probability a high fire load, and this is 80% likely to be the case, or 
 A 45% probability of a high fire load but this is 15% likely, or  
 A 65% probability a high fire load that is only 5% likely.  
 
These are all prior probabilities all from past experience. They can be viewed as 
relative weights of the individual probabilities, i.e., P(30%) = 80% for example. 
They are probabilities of “guessed or estimated”  probabilities 
 
The above inference suggests the probability that the true office fire is high, is: 
 
 P-prior_high = (0.3)(0.80) + (0.45)(0.15) + (0.65)(0.05) = 0.34, or 34% 
 
The probability that the event is true and that the sample estimates it as true is 
calculated by the joint probability of the event and the sample evidence [18]. 
 
 
                  
( ) ( ) ( )






                                 (2.5) 
 
 
The above gives: 
 




XEp =  
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  (2.5-a) 
 
In the above equation: 
 
P(Ei| Xj): Posterior probability of event Ei, that is the probability that the 
outcome is Ei if the observation is Xj 
 
P(Ei):  Prior probability of event Ei, which could be based on value 
judgement, past experience or intuition 
 
P(Xj| Ej): The probability that the observation is Xj if the event is Ei 
 
Now, suppose that one sample office was analysed and it was found that it had high 
fire loads; what is the probability of that the true fire load is high? 
 
The posterior probabilities are first calculated as follows: 
 
P-posterior_30% = (0.3)(0.80) / [(0.3)(0.80) + (0.45)(0.15) + (0.65)(0.05)] = 0.70 
 
P-posterior_45% = (0.45)(0.15) / [(0.3)(0.80) + (0.45)(0.15) + (0.65)(0.05)] = 0.20 
 
P-posterior_65% = (0.65)(0.05) / [(0.3)(0.80) + (0.45)(0.15) + (0.65)(0.05)] = 0.10 
 
Then the posterior probability that the true fire load is high is: 
 
P-posterior_high = (0.70)(0.30) + (0.20)(0.45) + (0.10)(0.65) = 0.37, or 37% 
 
The above procedure can be repeated as many times as required to incorporate new 
sample information. 
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The expected value of payoff if the survey is carried out and the optimal act (or 
decision) is made accordingly is: 
 
 











































        (2.6) 
 
 
The expected value of sample information, EVSI, is the difference between the 
expected value of payoff with sample information and the expected payoff without. 
 
 
 priorijormationsampleij RREVSI −− −= inf                       (2.6-a) 
 
For the last example, the value of sample information is (0.37-0.34) times the act 
under consideration (to spend £10000 on fire alarms, say). 
 
The EVSI presents a more accurate measure to aid decision makers which design 
methodology to adopt.  
 
If the study or survey is commissioned and once it is completed, the sample 
information become available and posterior analysis can be performed. Posterior 
analysis is a subset of pre-posterior analysis since a particular sample evidence, Xj-
pos, is determined hence only p (Xj-post │Ei) need to be considered. 
 
Posterior probabilities may be used as prior probabilities in potential further 




2.8 Role of Society in Engineering Design: Input from Psychology, Law and 
Insurance Providers 
 
Although unanimously conceded, acceptable failure rate is an issue of long-standing 
controversy. Man-made designs cannot be perfect. Some might fail and cause loss of 
life and property. The difficult question is: how much are we willing to lose? 
 
The compromise to safety is not of choice; it is essential to achieve practical design. 
In modern structural codes, safety indices are calculated through a trade-off between 
safety and economy. And here comes a more difficult question: how do we put a 
value to human life in the economic formula? 
 
The answer to the first question will involve psychologists in the process. Human 
perception of death, especially in fire, needs to be examined. Though death is 
universally accepted as inevitable, individual social characteristics, like religion, 
standard of living or life expectancy, contribute to the acceptance criteria. Public 
surveys, designed by both engineers and psychologists, are needed for this purpose. 
  
To the second, the answer potentially comes from insurance providers. Insurance 
companies implement rigorous risk assessment techniques in calculating premiums 
[22]. As providers of life insurance policies, they are best placed to resolve issues 
like the theoretical monetary value of life. Other sources could be implicit values 
from consumer expenditure or court rulings on compensation [4, 23]. 
 
The legislative environment in different countries differs by approach only. Various 
examples can be cited for legal instruments aimed at reducing risk to health and 
safety via imposition of control on certain aspects of public behaviour. In the USA, 
the Cigarette Fire Safety Act was introduced to reduce fire incidents due to smoking 
[24].  The verdict on any engineering scheme is made by society and societal input is 
essential to promoting engineering standards. 
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2.9 Value of Human Life 
 
Consensus on a parameter or model to estimate human life does not exist even 
among experts in law and sociology.  
 
The underlying principle in placing a value on life (so called value of statistical life, 
VSL) is to develop a situation where an individual accepts risk at a certain price. In 
the most simplistic form, economists compute the difference in wage between two 
jobs versus the difference in risk to life. If a job that involves an additional 2% risk 
of death for an extra £1000, he/she is implicitly placing a value of (1000/0.02 = 
£50000) on their life. This method is called the revealed preferences method. The 
contingent valuation method is another where a sample population are asked a series 
of questions about the amount they will accept to assume a higher risk. The point 
where the subject refuses the more money defines the highest risk. The calculation of 
VSL is similar to that of the former method. Both methods are criticised on grounds 
of subjectivity. 
 
Other methods exist, such as the consumer market behaviour method and the meta 
analysis method. A brief yet informative discussion of the various approaches can be 
found in Brannon [25] and a comprehensive critical review for VSL evaluation 
worldwide was published by Viscusi and Aldy [26]. 
 
Other formulations relate the value of life to the cost of risk reduction. One such 
formula is [23], 
 





V ==    (2.7) 
 
In the above, L is the expected loss due the risk of death, P is the probability of death 
and E is the expected loss due to acceptable protection expenditure. An example can 
be given for the risk reduced by using a pedestrian subway [23]. The probability of 
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being killed while crossing the road was 1.225x10-8 (UK figures in 1971), and it was 
estimated that using the subway would have been considered if the additional time 
was less than 16 seconds. People put a value of their time at £0.24/hour according to 
U.K. transport studies in 1971. The above results in a value of life of: 
 











The above equation suggests that the estimated value of life increases with the 
decrease of the probability of death, hence suggests a variation in the estimate of 
value depending on risk level. 
 
Other figures were also derived from the implicit value of consumption activity. A 
figure of $351,000 for the estimated value of life (US 1980) was based on the 
purchase price of smoke detectors, running cost of batteries and the changes of the 
probability of fire-related death or injury[23]. More details are available in references 
[23, 26]. 
 
2.10 Acceptable Risk - Utility theory  
 
The preceding sections perpetuate the notion that descriptive (the-how) decisions and 
normative (the-how should) decisions are the same. It assumes a uniform attitude 
towards risk perception across the population. This forms the backbone of the risk 
definition that amalgamates the probability and consequence of an event in a single 
risk factor.  
 
Quite naturally, different individuals place different values to money.  The extent to 
which a loss or gain makes on assets, individual psychology and experience play 
their role in decision making. Monetary value alone is not necessarily an adequate 
decision parameter. 
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
33 
 
Conceived by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738, the utility theory (sometimes called the 
preference theory) postulates that a value of an item is determined by its utility rather 
than its price. The utility an item yields is subject to the choice of the person taking 
the decision under conditions involving risk, and is a measure of the pleasure they 
derive from the item. It provides people a formula combining asset value and 
probabilistic risk indicators. 
 
The primary use of the utility theory is to derive utility functions as indicators for 
acceptable risk. 
 
To ignore the variability of attitude towards risk would be erroneous; to impose the 
intensive technical content of fire safety design on clients renders the design process 
circular. In almost all cases in fire safety design, the utility index, that apportions 
values reflecting preference, is implicitly assigned by the design team. 
 
Normalising the design alternatives to an audience of stakeholders requires the 
elimination of the attitude towards risk element from the decision formula. The 
simplest method to achieve that is insurance. Most stakeholders generally require 
insurance of buildings and contents in addition to public liability insurance as 
prerequisite to committing any investment. 
 
2.10.1  Utility Functions 
 
Utility functions are common scales to which design variables are mapped so as to 
facilitate comparison of alternatives. Common utility functions are: 
 
•  Monetary value, including value of statistical life (VSL) 
•  Time 
•  Life Quality Index (LQI) 




Once the values of design alternatives are expressed in terms of a utility, the design 
process becomes that of optimisation of the utility function under constraints of 
choice variables. For example, a design may require the cost of a fire protection 
system to be minimised subject to providing minimum evacuation time, limiting 
maximum structural damage, etc. The cost is in this case the objective function that is 
to be minimised and the constraint functions are those enforcing conditions of 
minimum evacuation time or maximum structural damage. A typical optimisation 
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Figure 2.4: Example of a Utility Function 
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
35 
 
2.10.1.1  Time 
 
How much will you pay to go back a few years in time? What do you need a holiday 
for? Why do we hate waiting? Why do they want a big garden? 
 
Time is a utility like no other. It is a measure of the dynamics of life as we know it. 
On the sociological level, vast resources are expended to increase the amount of time 
apportioned to pleasure. Cutting down journey times, less working hours, minimum 
hourly wage and increasing number of recreational facilities are evidence to the 
value we place on time. An interesting discussion of time as a source of utility was 
made by Zeckhauser [27].  
 
Within the economic context, it is not difficult to extract design life or investment 
life and apply it as an objective function. It facilitates integrating design with average 
age of population since constraint function would be the estimated age of two (or any 
chosen number of) generations. Engineering design practices contain examples of 
subjective provisions to that effect. Residential buildings are traditionally designed 
for 50 years whereas bridges for 100 years. Both types are static structures in the 
physical sense, but the impact of bridges on the dynamics of the economy surpasses 
that of buildings by orders of magnitude. 
 
A clear distinction should be made between the use of time as a utility function in 
this section and in section 2.14 where time is a choice variable within the context of 
the fire safety formula. 
 
2.10.1.2  L ife Quality Index, LQI 
 
The life quality index, LQI, is a measure of societal welfare incorporating three 
factors: Gross Domestic Product (G), Life Expectancy (E) and the proportion of time 
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spent for pleasure (1-c). The mathematical formulation was developed by Pandey et 
al [28] as follows: 
 
              ( ) EGL c
c
Q
−= 1                   (2.8) 
 
 
In the above formula, c is the proportion of life spent on generating G, hence (1-c) is 
the time spent on non-productive activities, including pleasure. It follows that the 
power ( )cc −1  is the proportion of time spent on generating wealth. 
The LQI is commonly used to determine the maximum expenditure a society is 
willing to make to reduce risk to life, commonly known as the Societal Willingness 
to Pay (SWTP). The SWTP is capped by the constraint that life quality must not be 
compromised; that is, LQI must increase or be kept constant. The first condition 
implies: 
 
             0≥QLd                                (2.8-a) 
 
 
The second condition requires that any increment of G, dG, required to increase E by 





































 −−== 1  (2.9) 




It follows directly that an estimate of what is known as a societal value of statistical 
















where E  is the average life expectancy. 
 
The above concept can be easily extended to arrive at WTP amounts for utility 
functions other than human life, for example, cost or design life. It has been used to 
determine safety levels in civil engineering facilities and life-cycle-cost of structures 
[28]. 
 
2.10.1.3  Custom Utility Functions 
 
Of particular interest to structural and fire engineers is the expected resulting from a 
possible hazard. Several models have been developed to represent damage [30-34]. 
Discussion of the latter and other models is left to Chapter 6, The Strength Loss 
Method. 
 
2.11  Design Optimisation 
 
Mathematical optimisation techniques are widely used in economics, engineering 
and operational research. Depending on the type of the problem, linear or nonlinear 
programming is used to arrive at stationary points of an objective function under 
equality or inequality constraints [35, 36]. 
 
The subject matter is the objective function for which extreme points are desired. The 




A function, f(x), is said to have a local extreme value (minimum, maximum or saddle 
point) at x0, if either [37]: 
 
 ( ) ( ) existnot  does  or          0 00 xx ff ∇=∇  
 
For a n number of choice variables, xi , the objective function, U(x) [36]: 
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with first partial derivatives, 
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Then, to have an extremum (maximum or minimum), the first-order necessary 
condition is: 
 
 0..........21 ==== nfff  
 
 
The second-order partial derivatives can be expressed as: 
 
 xHUd =2  
 
where, H is the Hessian determinant: 
 




















































The second order sufficient condition for a maximum is: 
 
 ( ) 01;..........;0;0;0 321 >−><> nn HHHH  
 
For a minimum, it is: 
 
 0,..........,,, 321 >nHHHH  
 
nH is the n
th principal minor of H  
 
The constraint function enforces mutual dependence between variables, xi, and has 
the effect of narrowing the domain of the objective function, as shown in figure 2.5. 
It typifies the requirement that the range of utilities obey available limited resources, 
and takes the form of equality or inequality constraint. Typical constraint functions 
are total working hours, total budget, available floor area, evacuation time greater 





2.11.1  Solution of Optimisation Problems 
 
A number of methods exist to solve the above problems, including those with the 
most general form of multiple objective functions under multiple constraints. These 
include linear programming techniques such as the Simplex and Gradient methods. 
Integer programming enables the solution of discrete linear programming problems, 
where the extremum must take an integer value. For non-linear problems, dynamic 
programming offers an efficient tool for solving discrete and continuous value 
problems. 
 







Tangent plane at 
maximum point, 
where: 
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Details of applications of the above methods to economic problems can be found in 
most mathematical economics textbooks, such as Chiang [36]. Majid’s textbook, 
[35], presents clear and comprehensive treatment of applications in structural 
engineering. 
 
2.12 Deterministic or Probabilistic Models? 
 
Both deterministic and probabilistic models can be used to evaluate candidate 
designs. The fundamental difference between the two approaches is analogous to 
prescriptive versus performance-based design. 
 
Deterministic models assign fixed nominal values for design parameters based on 
past observations. The input is processed by a range of tools; from simple models 
suitable for hand calculation to finite element analyses. The acceptance criteria are 
guaranteed by amplifying the demand through a safety factor. Selection of safety 
factors is subjective and usually relates to previous experience. 
 
Probabilistic models on the other hand address the uncertainty of design parameters 
by treating them as random variables or processes to derive safety factors or indices. 
Control is imposed by setting target reliability or safety indices that are directly 
related to the probability of failure. In addition, sensitivity analysis identifies those 
parameters whose variation produces little effect on the failure probability, and thus 
can be objectively classed as deterministic. 
 
It can be seen that deterministic methods are compromised versions of probabilistic 
techniques.  They are, however, computationally affordable and less intractable to 
practicing engineers. Practical design can be arrived at by a combination of both 
approaches with a satisfactory level of accuracy. Early probabilistic simulation can 
produce sensitivity information to truncate the number of random variables and 




Figures 2.6 [8] and 2.7 illustrate the general process of modelling in fire safety 





Stochastic Deterministic Reduced Scale Full Scale 
Field Zone 
1D, 2D or 3D 
models Semi-empirical Empirical 
Figure 2.6:    Modelling in Fire Safety Engineering  
  (excludes structural fire safety design) –  
(Reproduced from [8]) 




It is worth noting that a recent round-robin study of fire modelling indicated 
considerable discrepancy between modelling and experimental results [38]. The 
study employed deterministic models with well-defined fire compartment 
characteristics. The latter would have greatly reduced epistemic uncertainties, yet 
significant variation between predicted modelling results and actual fire behaviour 
was reported. The random uncertainty in fire behaviour is the likely cause of such 
anomaly. Robust models that account for aleatory and epistemic uncertainties need to 
be explored to arrive at values of safety indices with the ability to capture most 
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2.12.1  Advantages of Performance based design 
 
 Performance-based design reduces the uncertainty in one important design 
variable: client’s needs. The objectives address the specific project aspects and 
the client’s desired performance. Since code objectives set the lower bound of 
acceptance criteria, they sometimes fall short of meeting specific requirements. 
 It provides great flexibility in design. This opens the door to various options, 
where the  client and the designer have the opportunity to evaluate different 
schemes. 
 It provides a valuable tool for sound scientific assessment of design. Accurate 
and logical probabilistic-based comparisons between alternatives can be made. 
The decision criteria are aided by quantitative feasibility studies of the different 
alternatives. 
 Since the decision criteria are based on a study of objectives and qualifying 
solutions, the impact of changing the objectives (for example, the change of 
building occupancy) on the benefit-risk-cost formula can be evaluated precisely. 
Changing a paper warehouse to a theatre reduces the fuel, for instance, but the 
risk of casualties due to fire increases. The balance is always retained since the 
design is tuned to a minimum target safety index.  
 The reliability of the design option can be kept constant. 
 
2.12.2 Disadvantages of Per formance-based design 
 
 Designers must be highly qualified as they carry the burden of providing design 
alternatives. In contrast, prescriptive approaches are pre-qualified and may be 
used by designers with modest experience. 
 Design time and cost are higher. This may be balanced by potential savings in 
fire-protection materials and systems or reduced insurance premiums. 
 Higher quality control is required on design. As opposed to checking that a 
designer selected the correct detail of a wall-floor junction, a thorough review of 
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2.13 Case Studies 
 
2.13.1 Design of a new building in Sweden 
 
The following case study is by [39]. A 20-storey office building with each storey 
having a 2000 m2 net floor area is being designed. The specific features of the 
building are omitted here since they are not relevant to this discussion. 
 
Four strategies to fulfil the Swedish building code were proposed. Based on risk 
assessment of the building, life-cycle-cost (LCC) analysis was prepared for the four 
strategies. The following design criteria were used: 
 
•  Context:   LCC calculation for Building Owner and Contractor 
•  Cost of Fire damage: Material Damage, interruption to business and hidden 
cost of fire 
•  Cost of human life was not considered 
 
The calculations included allowance for otherwise investing the building cost in 
other ventures. To account for the net present value, a real interest rate that accounts 























r: real interest rate calculated for costing purposes (accounts for inflation) 
rc: interest rate calculated for costing purposes 
I: inflation 
 
Both the building owner and contractor would be insured against fire, and are 
therefore risk-neutral since the uncertainty in fire damage is covered by insurance. 
This precludes consideration of uncertainty in the calculated cost of fire damage, and 
fire damage can be evaluated deterministically. Thus, the Life-Cycle-Cost (LCC) was 
calculated using the following equation: 
 
 































Ainv: Initial investment (building cost) 
RMi: Running and maintenance cost in year i 
r: Real interest rate 
Ar: Reinvestment costs 
SFi: Average fire damage cost per year with insurance 
 
The average cost of fire damage with insurance, SFi was calculated as: 
 
 








IP: Annual insurance premium 
E: Excess 
pfire: Average number of fires per year 
A: Proportion of fires where damage is less than the excess 
pS : Mean value of property damage per fire which is less than the excess 
iS : Mean cost due to interruption of operations (downtime) per fire which is less 
than the excess 
hS : Mean value of hidden cost per fire 
 
For this project, the real interest rate, r, was taken as 5% in accordance with analyses 
carried out in Sweden in 1990s, and the mean value of hidden cost per fire, hS , was 
considered small and therefore ignored. The running and maintenance cost was 
assumed to remain constant. Moreover, the insurance was found to cover the damage 











, was replaced by a fixed fee. 
 
One LCC formula was developed for the building owner and another for the 
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Table-2.4  Relative Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) and Construction Cost for fire-
protection strategies (Reproduced from [39] 
Office Building Building Owner Contractor 
 LCC Ran
k 
Construction Cost Rank 
Strategy 1 
Prescriptive design with 
evacuation alarm 
US$ 169,200 4 US$ 110,500 2 
Strategy 2 
Prescriptive design with 
sprinkler system 
US$ 140,900 3 US$ 170,500 4 
Strategy 3  
Performance-Based Design 
Active fire protection with 
automatic fire alarm 
US$ 75,700 2 US$ 103,00 1 
Strategy 4 
Performance-Based Design 
Active fire protection with 
sprinkler system 
US$ (-) 1,900 1 US$ 134,500 3 
 
The negative LCC of strategy 4 indicates an increase in revenue to the client that 
surpasses the building cost. In this particular strategy, the number of escape 
stairways was reduced thus increasing the total rentable office area. 
 
2.13.2 Appraisal of an existing building in the USA 
 
American fire safety codes contain equivalency clauses that permit the use of 
alternative methods if their equivalency to prescriptive designs can be proven to the 
authority having jurisdiction [40]. The US Congress included an equivalency clause 
in the Federal Fire Safety Act 1992. Subjectivity in the decision process is precluded 
by implementing fire safety calculations to produce a set of acceptable solutions 
which are prioritised on the basis of their predicted impact on the risk associated with 
fire. 
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The General Services Administration (GSA) is the business agent for the US 
government that operates the federal government real property, and is the body 
responsible for the fire and life safety of employees and visitors occupying space 
under its control. Since federal government buildings are not covered by insurance, 
the GSA must implement risk management regimes that optimise fire safety design 
to ensure life safety, property protection and mission continuity. The following case 
study is of an existing federal government building that underwent a fire safety 
evaluation by the GSA as commissioned by the building owner. 
 
•  John W. Peck Federal Building -  Cincinnati, Ohio 
•  Constructed in 1963 
•  10 Floors above grade, basement and sub-basement 
•  6173 m2 per floor 
•  Limestone masonry external walls, reinforced concrete floors and roof. 
•  Fire safety provisions: 
o Egress: 6 stairwells constructed of masonry walls with 90 minutes fire 
rating 
o Discharge: Through structurally-unprotected corridors and lobbies 
on the first floor and a sprinkler-protected skywalk on the second 
leading to an adjacent building. 
o Sprinklers:  “Standard-type”  sprinklers in sub-basement, most of 
basement, skywalk, second floor south wing, computer rooms, 6th and 
7th floors. 
o Fire Alarm: Selective evacuation type where instructions are 
delivered via recorded tapes or live communication. Occupants of the 
fire floor are instructed to evacuate to the floor below, those one floor 
above the fire floor two floors down and occupants of the floor below 
the fire floor are notified to expect evacuees.  
o Elevators are automatically recalled to the second floor upon 




Tools for Verification: 
 
1. Prescriptive: Fire Safety Evaluation System (FSES) – Chapter 7 of NFPA 
101A: “Guide on alternative approaches to life safety” . FSES required 
sprinklers throughout, so the building failed. 
 




Fire modelling was performed using NIST-BFRL FASTlite to estimate the rate of 
development of hazardous conditions. Research by NIST and GSA indicated that, for 
typical office building fuel packages, the time histories of the heat release rate,
•
q , 







For 3-sided office workstations, α was found to be 0.117 kJ/s3. 
 
Design assumptions were further corroborated by site visits and examination of 
previous fire reports. Calculations were performed for typical self-contained offices 
or open spaces with doors open or closed. Fire was modelled to grow till flashover or 
oxygen starvation, through ventilation restriction or depletion. 
 
 
Elements of Equivalency Analysis: 
 
 Variables of Interest: Fire growth, Occupant awareness & response as well 
as time to reach safety. 
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 Verification: This is mainly: 
 
o Capability (capacity per system) 
o Adequacy (sufficient number of systems) 
o Reliability of systems (not covered in reference). In particular, the 
impact of sprinklers on developing hazardous conditions had to be 
assessed. 
 
 Design Options: 
 
o Calculation of a margin of safety for a number of alternatives and 
compare it to that of a code-complying building 
o Complete sprinkler protection: Prevents flashover at fire origin, limits 
fire size to less than 1 MegaWatt and prevents flame spread beyond 
room of origin. 
o Any other technical analysis procedure subject to approvals 
 
Margin of Safety Approach: 
 













ASET:  Available Safe Egress Time 




Acceptance Criterion:  
 
According to the regulations, an analysis must indicate that the existing or proposed 
safety systems provide a period of time equal or greater than the amount of time 
available for escape from a similar building compliant with a prescriptive solution. 
The following survival conditions for a typical sprinklered building (since the 
comparison was with a sprinklered building) were taken from the NFPA Fire 
Protection Handbook, 17th edition (applicable at the time): 
 
  Gas Temperature at Eye Level ≤ 93 °C 
  Maximum Ceiling Temperature 260 °C 
  CO Concentration ≤ 0.15% by Volume 
  
 
Interaction of multiple effects was not considered. The results of the analysis are 
shown in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5:  Time in seconds for Sprinkler Activation and Untenability (ASET) 





Office Open Plan 
Office Open Plan 
Office Open Plan 
None (Un-
sprinklered) 
X X 180 300 360 400 
Standard 260 425 180 300 ∞ 400 
Quick Response 171 299 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
 
Several models use hydraulic flow approximation to model egress time. The 
FASTlite suite contains such model which was used to calculate RSET.  The 
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occupant load used was 650 people per floor as per the Life Safety Code, and the 
possibility of two out of the six exits being blocked was considered. Results are 
shown in Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6:  Calculated Egress Time in seconds (RSET) 




Time to Clear 
Floor (seconds) 
Time to move One 
Floor (seconds) 
300 70 90 
6 
650 150 200 
300 100 140 
4 




The available and required times were shown to be quite close (ASET around 30 
seconds higher).  Standard sprinklers had no benefit in terms of increasing the 
available time, ASET. Their only benefit would be to protect people on other floors, 
hence the use of selective evacuation since people on other floors may not need to 
evacuate. The use of Quick Response sprinklers was recommended. 
 
A number of factors such as pre-movement time and limited mobility were not 
considered. Consequently, GSA recommended a safety factor of 2, 
 
 RSETASET ×≥ 2  
 
 







2.14 Utility Analysis of Structures in Fire – Time Concept 
 
To compute the probability of an event resulting from the interaction of different 
variables, all the variables should be dimensionally consistent. 
 
What do we use to measure failure or success of a member in fire? What kind of 
damage is caused to the structure by fire? What measure is likely to be most 
important to people? Fire accidents have been rare which may have contributed to 
inadequacies in fire research and limitations on its funding. Despite the scarcity of 
statistical data, structures sustained their integrity over a long period of time in most 
major fires. The rise in steel temperature alone cannot be correlated to the limit state 
of performance. Structural failure could vary according to different restraint 
conditions or the actual load on the member during fire, which involves other 
parameters in addition to temperature. 
 
The proposed approach comes from the answer to the question: What is most 
important to people? In a fire, people need sufficient time to leave the building 
safely. Time is crucial. 
 
2.14.1  Failure modes 
 
Almost all failures fall in one of the two following categories: 
 
 Ductile failures: Failure is progressive at macro-scale, and is a function of 
observable history of deformation or degradation parameters. A typical 
example is yielding of a tension member. 
 
 Brittle failures:  Failure here is a function of non-observable history of 
deformation or degradation parameters. These are mainly two types: brittle 
failures as in fracture and stability failures like buckling. 
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The core acceptance criterion for failure is time scale. The significance of time in the 
failure equation stems from the ability to impose sufficient control on failure 
progression. With almost all today’s mechanics derived in a macroscopic or 
observable scale, engineers so understandably aim to guide structural failure to a path 
that can be monitored and assessed within available resources. In practical terms, 
analysing collected data from a structural health monitoring system, for example, 
requires a minimum time space. If a particular failure spans a time interval smaller 
than this time space, it occurs without sufficient pre-warning. 
 
Time is proposed as a measure of safety. The conditions where the structure is 
required to develop a certain capacity represent the limit states. We then need to 
ensure that these limits are not exceeded. 
 
The choice of time as a measuring unit, or safety thermometer, is made for various 
reasons: 
 
 The behaviour of fire is dynamic, and thus time-dependent 
 Time carries the highest utility for people in the event of fire 
 A vast amount of statistical data is available about the behaviour of fire and 
people affected by fire, and it is all linked to time.   
 
Temperature is an important factor in fire. However, the response of structure to 
temperature effects varies drastically according the composition of the structural 
system, boundary conditions and restraint conditions to the members. One fire with a 
relatively low temperature could cause more damage to the structure than another 
more severe fire if it affects a more important part of the structure. Therefore, a 
single value of temperature cannot define the limit state. Structural deformations or 
over-stress are excluded for one important reason: the structure’s behaviour cannot 
be judged without reference to its temporal evolution. One will not accept excessive 
deflection during the evacuation time for instance, but is likely to accept it after the 
people and firemen evacuate. 
Performance-Based Design 
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 2.14.2 Safety Thresholds 
 
 In Japan, building design for earthquakes follows two criteria. In a frequent 
earthquake, the structure should be designed to satisfy strength and serviceability 
limit states. In a severe (less frequent) earthquake, the design must satisfy strength 
limit state requirement but not necessarily the serviceability requirements. The 
approach is obviously probability-based since higher risk of loss of serviceability 
(second threshold) is accepted with the lower probability of occurrence. The safety is 
not compromised at either threshold, which is the least the society can expect. 
 
In the UK and USA, allowable stress increase factors with wind or earthquake in the 
allowable stress methods are another example of probability-based safety concepts. 
They were specified to account for the fact that those loads are of a transient nature, 
and therefore a relaxation to safety measures is warranted. 
 
For structures in fire, three safety thresholds are proposed: 
 
 Time to evacuation 
 Time for firemen to save any remaining occupants and save property 
 Time to fire extinction 
 
First Threshold: Time to evacuation 
  
The demand is established through fire modelling. This time is normally the time 
required for awareness, pre-movement and movement plus a safety margin. This time 
should consider the proximity of the building to fire brigade, hospitals and 
emergency buildings and special cases where elderly people or children are 
involved,. 
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The capacity combines safety and serviceability for this case. The structure shall 
remain safe for evacuation throughout this time, the deflections and floor and 
ambient temperature limited to allow people movement. 
 
Second Threshold: Time for  Firemen to evacuate remaining occupants and save 
property 
 
Extra time justified for firemen for the following reasons: 
 
 Their risk of being injured is lower than ordinary people (no panic, protective 
gear, experience in dealing with fire) 
 They could prevent progress of fire and thus reduce further damage, or 
overall collapse. 
 They could save buildings of high cultural or strategic value. 
 
The structure should remain safe for evacuation throughout this time. Deflections 
and floor and ambient temperature may exceed those in the first threshold since 
firemen are trained and equipped with protective gear. 
 
Third Threshold: Time to Fire Extinction 
 
This is normally the time estimated for full fuel consumption, oxygen starvation or 
the successful suppression of fire. Again the safety may not be compromised, but the 
deflections and temperature may reach any level as long as they do not initiate 
collapse. Key elements (tree trunks) should be designed to a smaller probability of 
failure, while other members may have lower reliability indices, in line with the 




Proposed Design Procedure: 
 
1. Identification of the structural-fire scenarios: These are the fire scenarios most 
onerous to the structure, and do not necessarily include all the possible realistic 
fire scenarios. 
 
2. Establishment of the computational model that incorporates the structure and the 
structural-fire scenarios. 
 
3. Reliability analysis of the limit states, and establishment of objective 
(performance) functions constrained by safety requirements. Safety constraints 
are traditionally delivered by target reliability indices. 
 
The design converges to a constrained optimisation problem. For example, if we use 
life-cycle-cost, LCC, as an objective utility and the probability of failure as 
constraints, we may define: 
 
 
 requiredavailable ttg −− −= 111  Threshold-1 
 
 requiredavailable ttg −− −= 222  Threshold-2 
 
 requiredavailable ttg −− −= 333  Threshold-3 
 
 










 ( ) ettpgp arg11 0 −≤<  
 ( ) ettpgp arg22 0 −≤<  
 ( ) ettpgp arg33 0 −≤<  
 
In the above inequalities, p1-target is the target probability of failure for threshold-1. 
 
For all load scenarios, the reliability index must be kept constant for the relevant 
limit state (or threshold). This is better explained in the diagram of the Failure Event 
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1 
Figure-2.8    Failure Tree of Structure under Fire depicting Target 
Reliability Indices 
ettthreshold arg11 −− ≥ ββ
ettthreshold arg22 −− ≥ ββ




2.15 Concluding Remarks 
 
A coherent approach to performance based design for structures in fire was 
introduced in this chapter. Statistical decision theory manifests itself as the core 
engine for calculated decision making. Following the final iteration of the design 
process, optimisation techniques are implemented to achieve an extremum of utility. 
 
The case studies strongly support the implementation of performance based 
techniques; albeit neither study utilised probabilistic approaches in the analysis. Fire 
behaviour imposes significant epistemic and random uncertainties making irrational 













Explore alternative designs 





















The construction of two 30m diameter by 10m high steel tanks in Angern, Germany, 
was described by Terzaghi [5, 41] and Selvadurai [42]. 
 
In 1930, two molasses storage tanks were to be relocated. They were previously 
supported on heavily reinforced concrete slabs resting on conical piles. The substrate 
for the new foundation was a stratum of soft clay containing small quantities of fine 
sand and silt 2m below ground, underlain by very stiff clay at 4m depth. Molasses 
load could be classed as fluid pressure, which resulted in a calculated uniform base 
load of 162 kN/m2.  Settlement calculations revealed an estimated maximum 
settlement of 10cm at the centre of a concave deformed base. The tank base was 
therefore designed for the curvature of 10cm over a 30m circular slab. A 10cm thick 
concrete slab was constructed as proposed by Terzaghi. Later observations of soil 
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settlement were consistent with the initial expectation of a dish-shaped deformation 
albeit with few local irregularities. 
 
In a neighbouring site with similar soil conditions, a similar tank was constructed, 
but on a 0.5m thick reinforced concrete slab supported by 1.1x0.48m ribs. Due to the 
rigidity of the base, the contact stresses were minimum in the centre and maximum at 
the edges. This induced large moment and shear forces in the tank’s base slab which 
were overlooked in the initial design, leading to raft failure and the base rivets 
shearing. The tank contents flowed out and were lost. 
 
Terzaghi commented that: “the heavy expenditure in constructing the rigid bottom 
merely lead to failure” [41]. 
 
 
Near-Uniform soil Reactions under 
flexible base neutralise the loading thus 
the resultant shear and moment from the 
loading is nearly zero. (“Basic Form of 
Settlement” according to Terzaghi) 
Resultant, R-
Resultant, R-
Reaction = R- Load 
Central Moment, M  
M = R-Load (x1 - x2) 
Shear forces occur 
between centre and 
edge x1 
x2 
Tank – 1 
Flexible 0.1m thick 
Figure 3.1: Generic I llustration of Tank and Soil Forces  
(This illustrative figure is by this author) 
Tank – 2 
Rigid 0.5m thick Base on 
+2m, Ground 
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The above example highlights the influence of uncertainty in design and 
construction. Two sources of uncertainty can be identified: one that relates to the 
uncertainty in soil parameters and site conditions (aleatory uncertainty), and the 
second to the methods of analysis that were used to carry out the design (epistemic 
uncertainty). 
 
The work for the first tank followed an a priori, posteriori probabilistic logic. A 
priori soil investigative samples were used to infer general soil conditions, and 
rigorous analytical methods for the interaction between the tank base and supporting 
ground were used to calculate the base thickness. Post construction monitoring and 
observation of actual settlement were used to verify initial expectations. 
 
The designers of the second tank presumed that extra expenditure could offset the 
uncertainty in soil properties. The problem was further compounded by their lack of 
understanding of the behaviour of slabs on elastic foundations (illustrated in figure 
3.1). Such human error, or cognitive uncertainty, contributes to the majority of 
failures in structural engineering [2]. 
 
3.1 Risk Analysis 
 
Risk arises from uncertainty. If one can be 100% certain of an outcome, decisions 
can be made entirely on merits without fear of whether or not or how a hazard may 
materialise. It would be possible to build facilities to exact specifications and without 
recourse to any safety factor. 
 
The notion of risk expresses fear of the unknown. The two questions of essence are: 
is it, or is it not, going to happen, and how might it impact the venture? Thus that the 
classical formulation of risk discussed in the preceding chapter is: 
 




Risk is traditionally represented by the product of probability and consequence, or as 
sets of ordered pairs of probability and consequence on a graph [43], as in figure 3.2. 
 





Table representation is also used, commonly with a column ranking risk from low to 
high. Any of the above formulations falls within what is called probabilistic risk 
assessment, as described in figure 3.3. 
 
If the consequence is undesirable, the risk is defined as a negative risk and safety is 









  (3.3-a) 
or 
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The subscript, N, in equation (3.3-b) indicates normalised values; i.e., full safety, SN, 
or full consequence is equal to 1.Whichever format is used, safety increases if either 
or both of the probability and the consequence are reduced. In the hypothetical case 
of perfect safety, the argument holds that either the event is improbable or its 
consequence is not undesirable. Throughout this manuscript, the term “risk”  refers to 
negative risk that is associated with undesirable consequences. 
 
The former two components of risk can be defined within the realm of objectivity. 
Context is a third aspect of risk. It is easier to decide on a £100 purchase than £1 
million project. This aspect is highly subjective and intertwines personal psychology 
of the decision maker with value assessment of the venture. It is also specific to the 
project under consideration. It is essential that the context of risk (people, utilities, 
everything affected by it) is established for the risk assessment to be meaningful. 
Defining acceptable risk would be irrelevant without a clear understanding of the 





Figure 3.3:   Risk Components and Mathematical Models 
Risk  




The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce probabilistic methods, and more 
specifically reliability theory. It deals with the first element of the risk formula. The 
question of the second element of consequence can be generally addressed using 
utility theory which was briefly described in the last chapter. A more specific 
treatment of the consequence in terms of structural damage is presented in chapter 6. 
 
3.2 Types of Risk 
 
Risk can be categorised into four types: individually-perceived risk, collectively-




Individually-perceived risk describes one’s personal understanding and feeling about 
risk. It is highly subjective and depends on the magnitude of risk, personal attitudes 
and individual attributes. For identical ventures, decisions can differ between risk-
averse and risk-inclined individuals, and for persons with different levels of assets or 
experience. 
 
Perceived Risk Real Risk 
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Collectively-perceived risk represents a consensual evaluation of a group (usually a 
social group) towards a certain risk. It is a highly contentious matter as it depends on 
the political situation within the group and how information about risk is 
intercommunicated. 
 
Calculated risk is the mathematical modelling of the impact of a future event. 
Structural design codes are one premise for calculated risk which is the main subject 
of this chapter. 
 
The fourth type is real risk, which can be defined as the hypothetical calculated risk 
in the absence of epistemic uncertainty. The underlying assumption is that the 
measurements and cognitive methods used are sufficient and correct. It may be used 
where a significant amount of data can be gathered, such as traffic information for a 
road design, but is of little benefit for highly random and widely spaced occurrences 
such as earthquakes and tsunamis. 
 
Making a decision is fundamentally a cognitive process whose input is the data from 
risk evaluation. It would be rather simplistic to assume that psychological factors can 
be neutralised. Equally, it is unrealistic to expect that decisions can be rationally 
made in the presence of the fuzziness associated with heuristics. The de-convolution 
of the two risk types is not natural, but is necessary to allow clear boundaries 
between design options. 
 
3.3 Acceptable Risk 
 
Evaluating risk depends on the perspective through which risk elements are viewed. 
The manner is which risk is represented and communicated has a direct impact on 
risk acceptance. Evaluating is not calculating risk. It is rather using the quantitative 
results to extract qualitative information that make decisions easier. It is about how 
the information is represented, akin to viewing it from different angles. People find 




3.3.1 Representation of Risk Data and Risk Evaluation 
 
Three methods exist for risk evaluation: risk comparison, cost effectiveness and risk-
cost-benefit analysis. 
 
3.3.1.1  Risk Comparison 
 
Risk comparison is based on comparing the risk of a project to recorded statistical 
risks of common hazards, such as wind, earthquakes or road traffic accidents. The 
idea is to argue that risk can be acceptable since a precedent of acceptance was 
established for a comparable event. 
 
The above criterion has been applied with a clear distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary risks. People have different reactions to the nature of the hazard in 
question. Starr [4] postulated three hypotheses to describe public attitude towards 
death. The first concluded that the public are 1000 times less willing to accept death 
due to involuntary risk than voluntary risk. Secondly, the psychological upper bound 
for level of acceptability of risk can be taken as the statistical death rate due to 
disease. Thirdly, the acceptability of risk can be “crudely”  [4] proportionate to the 
third power of associated benefits. 
 
The first hypothesis underlines the mitigating effect of prior knowledge and 
understanding on the general perception of death. Death on the battlefield or that of 
stuntmen has less impact than that due to sudden strong earthquake. It is evident 
from the second hypothesis that the public have two views about death from disease, 
albeit subconsciously. One is that disease is not fully understood, no more than 
humans themselves, and the second is that the public have no option but to accept the 
existing disease fighting measures. Not unexpectedly, the third hypothesis highlights 
the different weights assigned to risk and benefit in the risk-benefit formula. 
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There is a general consensus on limits of risk acceptance for risk comparison 
purposes. These limits are from reference [4], and are summarised in Figure 3.5. The 
risk under consideration is the risk of death. 
 
 
The psychological impact of multiple-fatality events is significantly different from 
that of single or small number of fatalities. An account can be made to the public 
attitude to multiple deaths by using frequency-consequence curves, such as that in 
Figure 3.6. A suggested acceptance zone is shown below the dotted line for meteorite 
impacts, which is the shaded area in the figure. Statistics are for US population. 
 
It must be noted however, that the frequency-consequence curves are based on 
statistics of natural hazards which contains no societal input. As a result, they ignore 
the general tendency of the public to avoid high-fatality single accidents. Its use 
without modification may therefore be un-conservative. A number of researchers 
suggested a modification by reading Nm from the abscissa instead of N for the 
number of fatalities, where m > 1. For example, for a frequency of 10-5 on the 
meteorite line, the maximum number of fatalities is 100. Road accidents are more 
frequent than air travel accident, but they result in small individual numbers of 
fatalities. Hence, for the yearly fatalities in road accidents with a 10-5 frequency, 








Figure 3.5:   Acceptability Limits of Involuntary Death 
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- The 10-6 compares to death from natural hazards 




frequency however, the acceptable number of fatalities would be (100)1/m. If m is 




More rational methods based on empirical studies were also used. A study by Allen 
[2] on Canadian buildings concluded that an estimated 100 failures per year of the 
total 5 million structures in 1981, in Canada. Human error attributed to 90% of the 
failures, leaving only about 10% of the failures due to other causes. This yields an 
annual failure rate of 2 x 10-6, or 10-4 in a 50-year design life. 
 
In an interesting proposal to involve the number of persons at risk in a variable 



















Figure 3.6:   Frequency-Consequence Curve for Death Risk in the USA 
(Adapted from ref. [4] and modified) 
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Pf =      (3.4) 
where: 
 
Pf : Target failure Probability 
P0   : Basic annual failure probability, 10
-5  
T   : Lifetime of Structure in Years 
A : Activity factor (1.0 for buildings, 0.3 post-disaster, etc) 
W : Warning Factor 
n : Number of Persons at Risk 
 
The above formula was simple and sufficiently accurate as it was derived solely from 
empirical data. 
 
3.3.1.2  Cost Effectiveness 
 
The acceptance criterion in this method is based on the cost of reducing risk. In PRA, 
the marginal costs of reducing risk are compared for number of potential alternatives. 
Cost effectiveness is achieved when the funds are allocated to the option with the 
lowest marginal cost. 
 
The method obviously suffers from inconsistency in providing the cost of risk 
reduction for similar objectives. The expenditure on raising awareness of preventive 
measures of household fires is far less than that allocated to fire and rescue personnel 
for woodland fires. Yet, raising awareness targets a much greater number of people 
than would potentially be affected by wildfires. 
 
3.3.1.3  Risk-Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Combining risk, cost and benefit in a single model requires that all three elements are 





Calculating the monetary value for property or service is simple. Assigning a 
monetary equivalent to life is a different matter. Several explicit approaches to 
establishing a statistical value of life are available and are covered in more detail in 
section 2.9 of chapter 2. Other methods refer to court rulings, especially regarding 
the level of compensation offered, as an implicit way of estimating the monetary 
equivalent of life. 
 
3.3.2 Acceptable Risk Criteria 
 
Perceiving risk is quite complex and can differ significantly for the same risk 
depending on factors that include qualitative and quantitative elements. Risk-based 
decisions are influenced by the following risk characteristics: nature of the hazard, 
exposure, and the consequences and benefits of accepting the risk [4]. 
 
The analysis of personal and societal attitudes towards risk is the domain of 
sociologists and psychologists [4, 45, 46]. The main scope is the study of the non-
quantifiable heuristic factors that reflect social preferences.  
 
Acceptance of risk is based on an amalgamation of qualitative and quantitative 
factors. From the societal or heuristic point, it depends on three factors: need, control 
and fairness. Does the risk need to be taken? Are there sufficient controls on the 
process that produces risk? And, are the risk, costs and benefits equally distributed 
among the public?  
 
We need firemen. Hence they must be properly trained and equipped. And the whole 
public benefits from their service and are thus happy to share the cost.  
 
In contrast, the primary function or PRA is the evaluation of costs and benefits 
associated with a probable event. Calculated risk can unavoidably be deficient as it 
does not account for intuitive risk, or when it does, it is usually implicitly embedded 
within the quantitative models. 
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The above disparity in approach led to a number of conflicted opinions. In 
quantitative risk assessment for example, a risk is acceptable if it is small. In intuitive 
risk assessment (IRA), a small risk may not necessarily be acceptable. Why should 
there be more deaths in road accidents than in rail accidents? Why can’ t the same 
control be exercised on both?  
 
The most contentious issue is the treatment of death. While death is universally 
accepted in PRA, with equal statistical values of life, intuitive methods place 
different values to death depending on context. The public would look less 
favourably at the death of a victim in fire than that of a fireman who was attempting 
to save his life. The fireman was aware of and accepted the risk, and was simply 
doing his job. His death was tragic but most likely unavoidable, and could be classed 
involuntary considering his training and equipment. The victim’s death may have 
been avoided had fire brigade arrived earlier or in larger numbers. 
 
Quantitative risk analysis can demonstrate the efficiency of the fire service by simply 
comparing the cost of running the service plus statistical probability of firemen death 
to the statistical fatality rate of the public times the statistical value of life. Presenting 
such arguments, however, can be viewed as insensitive and sometimes politically 
incorrect. 
 
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of intuitive and calculated risk in terms of approach, 










Table 3.1:  Risk Assessment Methods 
Cr iter ion Intuitive/Heur istic Risk Assessment, IRA Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment, PRA 
Approach 
 Active approach that averts risk unless it is 
needed and applied under satisfactory 
constraints. Don’ t drive in snow. If you 
have to, use winter tyres. If nobody is 
going, there is no point in you going! 
 Based on risk perception 
 Passive approach that 
accepts all risk equally, 
and ranks them in terms 
of associated economic 
cost and benefit. 
 Based on quantitative 
analysis 
Factors IRA = f (need, control, fairness) 
PRA = f (probability, 
consequence) 
Purpose 
To represent a societal perspective on risk in 
terms of value and impact 
To ensure consistency of 
risk evaluation 
Acceptance 
Cr iter ia for: 
Risk 
Comparison 
Risk is acceptable if it unavoidable (like 
involuntary), controls are dependable and 
costs and benefits are equally distributed 
among the public. 
Risk is acceptable if it is 
small 
Acceptance 





 Risk compares well to risk characteristics 
(hazard, exposure, consequences, 
benefits), societal values and different 
mitigation options can be practically 
applied. 
 Not all deaths are equal; it depends on 
circumstances. 
 Statistical value of life can only be 
consistent for comparable risks 
 The best option draws the 
least funds. 
 All deaths are equal 
 Statistical value is used to 




3.3.2.1  Acceptable Risk Criteria for Structural Design 
 
Risks with a probability of occurrence between 10-7 and 10-6 are insignificant for 
legislative purposes [13]. (The source appears to relate to US legislation). This is 
consistent with figure 3.6.  
 
The above rules may be used to examine which effects or loads need to combined for 
structural design. The theoretical background for the development in load 
combinations for structural design is briefly described in chapter 4. The following 
calculations are mainly excerpted from reference [13] to illustrate an example case. 
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Assume for example that fire, F, and wind, W, are considered for a building. Fire and 
wind are intermittent and can be modelled using Poisson pulse processes. The 
probability of coincidence for two intermittent Poisson processes can be inferred as 
[13]: 
 
( ) ( )WFWF RRWFP ττ +×=∩    (3.5) 
 
, where τF and τW  are pulse periods in years, for fire and wind; RF and RW are the 
mean annual rate of occurrence of fire and wind respectively. 
 
 
Take a typical fire duration for 4 hours/year [13], or (4/(24x12x30) = 4.6x10-4 years. 
The rate of ignition can be taken as 10-6 /m2/year (based on number of fires per the 
total number of buildings), and assuming that sprinklers are present, the probability 
of development to flashover of 10-2. Therefore, for a typical 100m2 apartment, the 
mean rate of flashover-fire is 10-6 /year. Statistics for non-tropical windstorms 
indicate a duration of 4 hours (4.6x10-4 years) occurring 4 times a year.[13] 
 
The above gives a probability of coincidence of fire and wind of 3.68x10-8 from 
equation (3.5). This is significantly less than the 10-7 threshold; hence no need to 
combine the two actions for structural design. 
 
3.3.3 A Proposed Simple Formula for Acceptable Risk 
 
The above criteria for risk acceptance are strongly related to the general attitude of 
the public to involuntary risks. Events such as earthquakes are beyond human 
control, and the public would submit to their consequences as unavoidable. 
 
A reference accepted probability of an undesired event can be taken from statistics of 
an involuntary (e.g., natural) event. Let that be Pref.. The risk associated with the 




The difference in public attitude towards involuntary and voluntary risks can be 
established by statistical studies. Starr’s hypotheses are an example. However, it is 
probably more realistic to establish criteria based on comparative preference. It is 
easier for a person to state how much more they’re willing to accept one risk than 
another than to give abstract figures. The ratio of public acceptance of a risk under 
investigation, Ri, to the reference risk is vi. The consequence of the reference risk and 
the investigated risk are Cref and Ci respectively. 
 
It is reasonable to design any utility to a uniform acceptable risk. The acceptable risk 
reflects public preference, and therefore includes the preference factor ci.  Hence, 
 
Risks "Acceptable" are  these,iref RR =   (3.6) 
 






CP =     (3.7) 
 
If Cref. And Ci can be established from past statistics, this equation can be used in 
two different ways: 
 
 To derive a maximum acceptable probability of occurrence for event i,  
Pi-acceptable,  (say of fire), which can be implemented in the design of the 
process or building (say fire detection and active protection measures), or 
 If the probability of occurrence, Pi, is accepted as fact from past statistics, 
to derive a relative value of acceptable cost as a consequence of event i, 
which may be suitable for use in overall cost and in compensation (except 
for acts of deliberate malice). 
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The above formula is used as basis for a propose target reliability index for use in 





Take earthquakes as the reference event, and use estimated annual figures 104 
fatalities with 10-2 frequency. For a population of 300 million, the fatality rate is 
3.3x10-5 per person/year. The consequence in this example is limited to the number 
of fatalities only. Assume that a survey indicated that the public are 1000 times less 
willing to accept casualties due to fire compared to earthquakes; i.e. v = 1/1000. The 
probability of occurrence of a developed fire for a 100m2 apartment can be taken as 
10-6/year. [13]. Assuming an average of 4 persons per apartment, the probability of a 
developed fire is 2.5x10-6 per person/year. This yields an estimated maximum 




























For the whole population, the above gives an acceptable number of fatalities due to 
developed fire as 4x104/year. It is larger than the fatalities due to earthquakes, mainly 
because fire is significantly less frequent, and its damage is limited to smaller areas 
confined to the vicinity of the initial fire. The figure must not be interpreted as the 
number of fatalities the public would accept every year, nor should the same logic be 
applied to the annual fatalities due to earthquake. The expected annual number of 
fatalities is the risk of death, which is the product of the annual probability and 
consequence. In the case of fire, that is (2.5x10-6 x 4x104 = 0.1 fatality per year), 
compared to (10-2 x 104 = 100 fatality per year) for earthquakes. The ratio of 0.1 to 




It would be interesting to compare the above figure with the statistics of the annual 
number of deaths due to fire. This can give an indication of the performance of the 
national fire safety strategy. 
 
The public acceptance is largely influenced by past statistics. It is possible that 
fatality rates higher that the above are accepted if they are reasonable lower than the 
corresponding rates of previous years.  
 
3.4 Safety Legislation 
 
Legislating for safety is limited to defining the minimum functional requirements of 
elements or processes. The function of law is not to impose the specific aspects of 
acceptable solutions. It is more to define the forms of acceptable processes that may 
be applied to arrive at acceptable solutions. Thus conformity is achieved if it is 
established that an acceptable process had been used in carrying out the work, even if 
failure had ensued. 
 
In most cases, legal instruments such as the building regulations contain sets of pre-
qualified options that achieve conformity. Such means are deliberately left generic so 
as to permit a variety of solutions, and to prevent legal instruments from becoming a 
barrier to innovation. The detailed qualitative and quantitative procedures reside 
appropriately in technical documents, such as design codes and standards. In a way, 
the building law defines the manner of an acceptable design, and the technical 
standards facilitate its realisation, as illustrated in figure 3.7. 
 




The legal framework governing engineering works sets two acceptance criteria: 
prescriptive and performance-based. Both approaches serve the fundamental purpose 
of facilitating decision making. 
 
The specific background objectives for prescriptive designs are obscured.  Despite 
their technical context, the use of prescriptive solutions as deemed-to-satisfy 
solutions presents itself as a means of compliance with the law. It provides a simple 
decision-making formula: accept or reject. Owing to this binary property, all 
acceptable alternatives have exactly the same value in terms of functional 
performance. The factor that influences decisions simply becomes cost. The 
application of the risk formula is not possible, due to the absence of the probability 
element. 
 
The primary distinction of performance-based design (PBD) lies in the explicit 
formulation of the design objectives. When evaluating a design alternative, a limit 
state function separating the demand objectives from solutions is established. In 
practical terms, these are the sets of functional requirements that must be met under 
Legal instruments 
Objectives: What to do 
Technical documents 
Mathematical or 
Experimental models of 
Objectives: How to do 
Figure 3.7:   A Schematic Representation of the 




predefined actions, such as deflection under load or available safe egress time during 
fire. The two element of the risk formula are handled separately: the uncertainty 
content in design parameters is managed uncertainty modelling techniques, whereas 
utility theory provides a suitable paradigm for the consequence. 
 
The accountability process can be affected depending on the route taken. Ruling on 
whether or not the set of prescriptive rules are met is straightforward and relatively 
inexpensive. Arbitration is PBD, on the other hand, involves expert opinion, or 
opinions, can be lengthy and significantly more expensive. 
 
Decisions made on grounds of coherent probabilistic risk assessment can be 
defended with ease. It is also vital that risk information is communicated clearly to 
individuals at risk and those with the responsibility of mitigating its effect. A 
common acceptable rule in arbitrations is: “ If the decision is the result of an 
acceptable decision process, then it is not necessary to agree with the decision to 




It is unlikely that the complexity of risk can be captured in its entirety in an 
informative framework. For most economically-driven projects, even at the corporate 
level, probabilistic risk assessments remains the method of choice for decision 
making. Intuitive risk reflects the societal aspects of risk and is unfeasible to 
integrate in quantitative models.  
 
Codes are not intended to manufacture optimum designs. Their main function is to 
ensure uniformity and efficiency in safety-driven engineering practice. IThey unify 
the language of design which simplifies communication and accelerates production 
in addition to providing measures for quality control. The task of producing cost-
effective buildings or products is the responsibility of designers. 
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Where performance-based design is opted for, probabilistic analysis becomes the 
logical choice. It is the natural paradigm for a structure that is to be constructed in the 
future, for loads and actions that are forecast in the future. 
 
Probabilistic risk assessment is a rational tool that aids (just aids) informed decision 
making. It should not be construed as a method that can completely evaluate risk, but 
rather a means of facilitating comparison and examining the effect of increasing risk 
or cost. It is neither entirely objective, nor absolutely accurate. A number of 
omissions, approximations and value judgements would be exercised in its 
preparation. It would remain valid as long as the assessment process is acceptable 
and consistent.  
 
The use of probabilistic assessment without intuitive risk components puts the 
assessment out of context and of little, if any, value. Both approaches can be applied 
simultaneously by enforcing compromises on each. The extent of the realism of risk 
and the process of cost benefit analysis are better handled by probabilistic risk 
calculation, while the upper limit of acceptable risk should be set via a 
comprehensive heuristic study. The application is mostly at the national level 
















Structural Safety and Reliability 
 
 
Structures and engineering systems are designed to respond to imposed actions in a 
manner that does not diminish their functional characteristics. The mode of response 
may be sustained, as in plastic deformation, or transient, such as vibration under 
wind or earthquake, or a mixture of both, as in the temporal evolution of deflection 
during fire. Satisfactory performance is achieved whenever the response does not 
diminish the fitness of the structure to perform the function for which it was built, for 
the length of its design life. 
 
The above concept has long created controversy, a very productive one indeed. How 
many actions does one really expect? What data should be collected? How long 
should one observe to establish periodicity or aperiodicity? Can actions and effects 
be quantified? How certain are the calculated or tested design resistances? How 
accurate are the deterministic methods? Who sets the limits for acceptance of designs 
and how? Simple as they may seem, attempts to answer these questions have resulted 
in the birth of a vast array of interconnected disciplines of science and engineering. 
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Reliability engineering evolved from an ancillary technique embedded in safety 
evaluation to a highly sophisticated independent discipline. 
 
The academic and public interest in safety was largely stimulated by unexpected 
failures. The word unexpected is underlined as it directs this discussion to its core. 
Had failures been expected, perhaps some mitigation would have been possible. 
When failures are expected, they are easier to understand, easier to avoid in the 
future, and more importantly, easier to accept. 
 
The notion of expectation expresses an understanding of the uncertainty surrounding 
future ventures. Such understanding makes calculated values interpret as expected 
values, and leads directly to the methods of calculated predictions, more commonly 
known as probability theory. 
 
 
4.1 Uncertainty Modelling 
 
Uncertainty is a natural property of our knowledge sphere. It is why we accept 
tolerances and make extra allowances. The models we use in different branches of 
science are based on our knowledge of past observations. Within the relevant errors, 
they can be true representatives only of the measured samples of past phenomena. As 
we choose to extend their applicability to future phenomena, we assume the latter 
inherit the same characteristics. In addition, our knowledge is an assembly of tests 
and analyses, which contain a vast array of assumptions, approximations and errors. 
 
The two contributors to uncertainty are the phenomenon itself, and the methods of 
measurement and analysis. Aleatory, non-cognitive, and random uncertainty are 
common term for the former, and epistemic, subjective, or cognitive uncertainty 
relates to prediction errors, and describe the latter [3, 47]. 
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4.1.1 Sources of Uncertainty 
 
Aleatory uncertainty refers to the non-cognitive elements of the phenomenon which 
characterise the inherent randomness that results in a range of observed values.[48] It 
is intrinsic to the physical phenomenon or parameter, and as such is naturally 
objective. The objectivity makes it easier to reduce by improving sampling and 
observation and increasing measurement accuracy. 
 
The main sources of aleatory uncertainty are [3, 47]: 
 
 The random characteristics of the physical process 
 The use of sample statistics to infer information about the physical parameters 
 Lack of knowledge 
 
Epistemic uncertainty relates to the cognitive part of studying a process. For 
example, how certain can one be that all the parameters of interest have been 
included in a performance function? Evidently, cognition is a personal attribute, 
which leads to one important characteristic of epistemic uncertainty: subjectivity. 
The associated vagueness results in fuzzy sets which are beyond the practical 
capabilities of probability analysis, and better treated in the premise of fuzzy logic. 
[48, 49] 
 
Epistemic uncertainty is associated with the following sources [3, 47]: 
 
•  The definition of parameters, such as objective or performance functions, 
indicators of quality such as skill of workers. 
•  Human factors, such as errors in measurement and mishandling of data 
•  Modelling errors that result from approximations and assumptions 
•  Definition of interrelations between parameters. 
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The mathematical models used to evaluate uncertainty depend on which of the two 
above types is considered, as is shown in figure 4.1. It must be noted the two types 




Probability theory forms the basis of reliability techniques and is applied to assess 
non-cognitive or random uncertainty. It is based on a binary logic with elements 
either belonging or not belonging to a set. For element Z with a state variable x of 0 
or 1, set S can be defined as: 
 
   { }1: == xZS    (4.1) 
 
 
Fuzzy logic is used for cognitive uncertainties. Elements in fuzzy logic belong to a 
set with varying degrees of belief, or grade membership values ranging from 0 to 1 
[48]. For a fuzzy element Y with membership function αy, in set A: 
Non-cognitive, 
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[ ]{ }1,0: ∈∈= yAYA α   (4.2) 
 
Any analysis involving fuzzy variables can be performed by using permutations of 
variables modified by their respective membership values, most commonly maxima 
and minima [47, 48]. 
 
 
4.1.2 Modelling Errors 
 
Prediction errors, or modelling errors, can be incorporated within the random 
variable under consideration. The true “state of nature”  [3] value of a single random 
variable X, can be represented by the product of the prediction error, ε, and the model 
value Xm. 
 
mXX ε=      (4.3) 
 
The first two moments of Xm can be obtained from the mean and variance of samples. 
Both the model values, Xm and ε, are random and can be assumed statistically 
independent, with means µXm and µε and coefficients of variation, δXm and δε. Hence, 
the mean value of X can be calculated as: 
 
mXX
µµµ ε=      (4.4) 
 
A measure of its uncertainty of X is its coefficient of variation, δX, which is: 
 
22
εδδδ += mXX     (4.5) 
 
The above results may be generalised for a function, Z = εf f(Xi), of multiple 
variables, Xi, yielding the following results [3]: 
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It is also possible to combine non-cognitive and cognitive uncertainties by 
incorporating membership functions of fuzzy variables. The resulting fuzzy-random 
probability density function contains the random distribution function, PDF, of 
random variables and normalised weight or membership functions, PMF, of fuzzy 
variables. More detailed description can be found in references [47, 49]. 
 
Decision is inherently a binary operation. It therefore requires a boundary surface 
separating acceptable from non-acceptable solutions, which must belong to crisp 
sets. By its mere position, a boundary surface sets the lower bound of acceptable 
solutions. A limit state in structural engineering is one such boundary surface. 
 
Integrating fuzzy logic in design codes poses a difficult question to lawmakers and 
design professionals: how can design liability be identified in the absence of a clear 
cut-off between accepted and rejected solutions? The fundamental barrier to its 
Structural Safety and Reliability 
89 
application is the subjective nature of fuzzy elements. The verdict in any dispute is 
binary and requires rigid rules to enable its application. On the other hand, truth 
values, or membership grades, are subjective: what is good for one person may not 
be for another. If a decision based on a truth value results in failure, how can blame 
be apportioned if no clear lines were crossed? It appears that this is one reason why 
modern design codes are based on probabilistic methods, which exclusively deal 
with random uncertainty. Cognitive uncertainty due to lack of knowledge or skill, 
etc., is adequately catered for by insurance, such as professional indemnity insurance. 
Law enforcement becomes considerably easier when the safe and unsafe regions are 
clear.  
 
The following treatment relates to structural design codes and therefore is restricted 
to reliability analysis.  
 
4.2 The Framework of Probabilistic Design 
 
Design is a rational assessment of an entity that is forecast in the future. It is a 
process of prediction. What we know about design is no different from what we 
know about the future: it is merely expected. 
 
Probabilistic design extrapolates past observations a few steps in time so as to project 
the future condition of a utility. It thus presumes that the forecast utilities inherit 
similar demands and capacities. 
 
The greatest benefit of probabilistic analysis is in how it effects realism in design. 
Studying the stochastic history of loads, for instance, reveals which loads need to be 
considered, which types should be combined, and how. It also directs research to 
areas most influential on the process at hand, as is evident in medical research. One 
may look at probabilistic analysis as a means of optimising the use of knowledge and 
our limited resources.  A recent paper [13] analysed the coincidence of fire with 
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other loads, and concluded that fire need not be combined with wind, non-sustained 
live, roof or earthquake loads, apart from when the fire is caused by the earthquake. 
 
The overall process of probabilistic calculations is simple. It begins with selecting 
the parameters of interest and collecting data using any of the widely available 
measurement techniques. The data is analysed and subsequently refined into 
statistical models. The statistical models are extended to probabilistic models which 





Random data collection and analysis is quite an involved subject and specialised 
sources should be consulted for further details [21, 50-52]. It is also of no relevance 
to this work. Statistical analysis is also beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
The above framework is strictly limited in scope. No means are available to establish 
that data is sufficient, since sufficient can only mean sufficient if all data is known or 
can be estimated. Records of fifty years of wind data cannot ensure that the next fifty 
years will witness the same weather conditions. The real scope is to have an 
environment where decisions about the future can be made by judging the past. 
Events that display higher uncertainty may then receive more effort to reduce the 











Figure 4.2:   Probabilistic Design 
(Reproduced from reference [1]) 
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Uncertainty is intrinsic to all branches of human knowledge, not only engineering. 
This chapter however, concentrates on the uncertainty areas of relevance to structural 
engineering. It introduces reliability theory, which deals with the first element of the 
risk formula. The question of the second element of consequence can be generally 
addressed using utility theory which was briefly described in chapter 2. A specific 
proposal for treatment of the consequence in terms of structural damage is presented 
in chapter 6. 
 
It must be emphasised that reliability is the subject of neither this chapter nor indeed 
this thesis. Its importance stems from the fact that it provides the mathematical 
foundation which describes the uncertainty in whether or not the design objectives 
are met, hence it fits appropriately in the framework of PBD. This chapter is at an 
introductory level, and readers interested in the subject have a wealth of excellent 
references at their disposal [2, 3, 43, 48, 49, 53-57]. A number of authors have kindly 
provided materials free of charge on the worldwide web. The second edition of 
Ditlevsen and Madsen’s book “Structural reliability Methods” , the reliability course 
notes at the Indian Institute of Science, publications of the Joint Committee on 
Structural safety (JCSS), NASA’s publications, two of which are in references [58, 
59], are some examples. ” (http://www.web.mek.dtu.dk/staff/od/books/OD-HOM-
StrucRelMeth-Ed2.3.7-June-September.pdf), 
(http://nptel.iitm.ac.in/courses/Webcourse-contents/IISc-
BANG/Reliability%20Engg/New_index1.html ), ( http://www.jcss.byg.dtu.dk/). 
 
4.3 Brief Review of the History of Structural Reliability Engineering 
 
The oldest record of building codes dates back to Hammurabi (1750 BC) [60] in 
ancient Babylon in Iraq. Having confined the scope to punitive measures for 
unsatisfactory performance, they were more of a legal instrument than a technical 
design code. Hammurabi’s code could be classed as a single-objective performance-
based design code specifying the “what”  but not the “how”:  the building must not 
collapse, nor cause harm to users. With that in mind, all options were open to 
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designers to achieve the design intent. The magnificent structures they built are but a 
testimony to what profuse inspiration was afforded by that culture of freedom. 
 
Unfortunately, we have little or no records of any design codes that may have been 
used by other civilisations. 
 
The evolution of building code as an independent entity started in 1189 with the 
party wall specification in London’s building regulations. The code specified 3 ft 
thick by 16 ft high party walls aimed at controlling the spread of fire. The set of 
regulations grew to include prohibiting combustible roof covering and a 9 ft limit on 
the minimum height of building projections over streets so as to allow the movement 
of people on horses [60]. 
 
Codes continued to grow during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the UK. 
The desire to control the spread of disease in cities resulted in regulating the density 
of people by banning infill and subletting.  
 
Failure is an established motivator for development. This has typically been the case 
in structural design codes. The 1666 great fire of London stimulated the development 
of a comprehensive suite of codes, focusing on the control of fire spread. Structural 
design requirements were stipulated for masonry walls and timber in the first 
appearance of distinct structural codes. Health and safety rules emerged following 
death and injuries due to building collapse. The technical requirements for quality 
control of brick and mortar were introduced during the seventeenth to the nineteenth 
centuries. 
 
The introduction of reinforced concrete and steel in the nineteenth century paved the 
way to emergence of the Working Stress Design (WSD) code in the early twentieth 
century. 
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The earliest building codes in the United States date back to the New Amsterdam 
1625 regulations on roof types [61]. Restrictions on wooden chimneys and thatched 
roofs were introduced in Boston in 1630, and New York adopted the first code in the 
US in 1850. The proliferation of codes in the Us began in the early parts of the 
twentieth century by a number of trade organisations, like the Building Officials 
Conference of America (BOCA), who published its first code in 1950. BOCA’s code 
was used in the Northeast and Midwest of the US but large cities opted for their own 
codes owing to their unique building systems and political influence.[61] 
 
Codes have always been written for the purpose of reducing risk. The development 
of mathematical models in probability theory resulted in a natural progression of 
codes from a product of experience and judgement to reliability-based technical 
standards. Most reliability engineering research and development occurred in the 
twentieth century. The following is an abbreviated version of some noteworthy work, 
and more comprehensive reviews can be found in references [2, 60, 62]. Dates in 
brackets for the following two paragraphs are from reference [2]. 
 
In the twentieth century, the implications of uncertainty on structural safety were 
realised as early as the 1920s. Forssell (1924) proposed the principle of optimality, 
stating that the purpose of design is to minimise the total cost which comprises the 
initial cost plus the cost of failure. Probabilistic-based design framework appeared as 
early as 1926, when Mayer suggested design based on Mean & Variance as safety 
measures which is similar to later proposals by Basler (1960) and Cornell (1974). 
Mayer’s work, however, found no application in design offices. Pierce (1926), 
Tucker (1927) and later Weibull (1939) introduced the weakest link theory that stated 
that a chain is as strong as its weakest link. Weibull (1939) presented a 
comprehensive treatment of statistical methods in strength of materials. The work of 
Freudenthal (1947) on the fundamental problem of safety under random loads was 
the first to initiate acceptance within the design community. Plum (1950) noted the 
discrepancy between observed low failure rate of reinforced concrete slabs and the 
economically-optimum safety levels in design. Johnson (1953) introduced the theory 
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of structural reliability and economical design, including statistical methods 
developed by Weibull (1939). Baker (1956) derived the weighted safety factors 
shown in the following section.  In 1960, Basler proposed safety measures based on 
mean and variance akin to Mayer’s (1926) work. Lind et al (1964) characterised 
rational design in a code as a process of selecting a set of best values of loads and 
resistance. They suggested an iterative procedure for the load and resistance values, 
with the code being a control “black-box”  to optimise safety and cost. 
 
The period from 1967 to 1974 witnessed a surge in the academic interest in structural 
reliability theory. Design professionals on the other hand, were still reluctant to use 
what seemed to be too radical at the time. Their argument rested on a number of 
issues: imperfect mathematical models were used to arrive at near-perfect rational 
design paradigm, the computational onus was cumbersome and therefore prohibitive, 
and insufficient data was available to perform statistical analysis with reasonable 
accuracy. Very few felt the need for change in the first place; when deterministic 
methods performed so well with very few failures, usually attributed to human error 
or “Acts of God”. 
 
Cornell proposed the second-moment reliability index [2]. His index was based on a 
linear approximation at the mean values of load and resistance; hence it suffered 
from inconstancy to equivalent mechanical formulations of safety. Further 
refinements by Hasofer and Lind resulted in the development of Hasofer-Lind 
reliability index, which the most widely used safety index today. The relation 
between the reliability index method and practical design was confirmed by Ravindra 
et al [2]. Further modification followed which lead to the evolution of a number of 
codes, such as the CSA (Canada, 1974), NKB (Norway, 1977) and OHBDC 
(Canada, 1983). 
 
Some researchers questioned the viability of reliability-based methods in describing 
real life processes. Human error, the main suspect in every case for failure, is not 
accounted for in the formulation of those methods. Understandably, human 
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behaviour is far too complex to model, and any such attempt would have to involve 
psychologists and sociologists: an option that is not only intractable to the concerned 
parties but hardly feasible in practical terms. A survey by Matousek [2] on 800 
failures concluded that structural failures were almost always due to gross human 
error. As a result, such failures do not necessarily occur at strength levels close to the 
mean strength. In other cases, failure was caused by exceptionally high loads, again 
far from the mean design loads. Brown [2] showed that the failure rates predicted by 
the theory were too small. As an example, failures of suspension bridges were at a 
1:40 rate in the twentieth century. 
 
The former arguments no doubt devalue reliability methods as tools for modelling 
“real structural behaviour” . This is very true. The main purpose of a code is to draw 
policies that “control”  the design process by implementing a trade-off between safety 
and economy. It can be argued that reliability methods provide a tool for such 
“control” . More understanding of real performance is vital for code development; but 
how can the “more understanding”  be input to the code without a rational 
framework?  
 
Reliability methods present a balance formula between load and strength. Each side 
is carefully segregated from the other, so that additional knowledge of either side can 
be input in the corresponding probabilistic model. The balance mechanism does the 
rest:  more knowledge about loads leads to smaller load factors and thus greater 
loads are allowed, and the same logic applies to the strength side.  
 
Silo structures present an excellent example of the importance of rationally-based 
design standards. According to Rotter [63], defective standards for loading and 
design contributed to the high rate of silo failures (over 1000 failures in the 1980s in 
North America). Oversimplified loading regimes coupled with simplistic behaviour 
models were the main causes of the exceptionally high failure rate. 
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4.3.1 Working (Allowable) Stress Design (WSD/ASD) 
 
This method has been by far the most popular in the engineering design offices. The 
basis of design is quite simple; estimated actual values of actions are selected, then 
the structure is designed so that the effect of the actions is within the assumed linear 
response, with the capacity in excess of the failure effect by a pre-determined safety 
factor. Baker, in 1956, proposed a simplified method for calculating the safety factor 
based on probabilistic evaluation [64]. The method accounts for the different weights 
of factors affecting the capacity, as shown in Table 4.1 below. The onus of selecting 
the appropriate weight was left on the design engineer.  
 
 
Table 4.1 - Baker’s Weighted Safety Factor [ Safety Factor =  1.0 +  Σ Weight / 10 ] 
Weighted Failure Effect Minimum Weight Maximum Weight 
1. Results of Failure: 1.0 (less serious) 4.0 (serious) 
2. Workmanship: 0.5 (cast in place) 2.0 (factory-manufactured) 
3. Load Conditions: 1.0 (e.g. load cases 
including wind) 
2.0 (simple spans or 
sustained loads) 
4. Importance of member in structure  0.5 
5. Warning of Failure  1.0 
6. Depreciation of Strength  0.5 
 
 
WSD specifications incorporated parameters to cater for the frequency of occurrence 
for loadings or undesirable events. Stress increase factors were prescribed to amplify 
the allowable stresses for transient loads such as wind or earthquake loads. 
Evidently, whether explicitly employed or not, a probabilistic dimension mobilised 
the thinking process behind the categorisation. 
 
One of the fallacies that designers had to contend with was that the true factor of 
safety remained unknown. Design was acceptable as long that the structure appeared 
intact, even though it may be on the verge of failure [41]. The link between the 
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predicted value of actual factor of safety and the target value could only be 
established by probabilistic techniques. An appreciation of this concept, further 
motivated by accidents such as the NASA challenger accident in 1986 [59], resulted 
in elevating safety treatment to Limit State Design. 
 
4.3.2 L imit State Design (LSD) 
 
The shortcomings of WSD insofar a lack of clear connection to the failure state, 
paved the way to Limit State Design (LSD), also known as load and resistance factor 
Design (LRFD) in the United States. Satisfactory design must attain a capacity that 
equals the demand as minimum, and is conventionally amplified by a safety factor. 
The critical condition at which capacity equals demand is called the limit state. 
 
This method was first used in the former Soviet Union and other East European 
countries in the 1940’s [2], and formed the format of the American Concrete Institute 
code in the early 1960’s. Research work based on probabilistic techniques and 
statistics on behavioural models for the limit states followed rapidly, and limit state 
methods are now the norm in most countries. Reliability engineering evolved from a 
method embedded in safety analysis to an advanced engineering discipline. 
 
The format for limit state design varies between codes but the underlying 
methodology is the same. The capacity of the structure, R, is calculated, and then 
reduced using a factor, ϕ, to account for probabilities of under-strength due to the 
use of nominal section properties, approximations in computational models, generic 
material properties and defects in construction.  This factored capacity is then 
compared to the load effects, Q, that are amplified by the respective load factors,γ, 
that account for uncertainties of loads. Thus, for the structure to be safe and 
serviceable, it should satisfy the following condition 
 
    Safeis StructureQR ⇒≥ γϕ        (4.8) 
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The values of the capacity reduction factor, ϕ, and the load factor, γ, depend on the 
uncertainty in the structural response to certain actions (tension, flexure, shear, 
torsion) and the load effect (dead, live, snow, wind). The objective of modern LSD 
codes is to ensure that the probability of failure is acceptably small, and a trade-off 
between safety, economy and practicality is employed to justify acceptable failure 
probabilities. This concept forms the backbone of the determination of the above 
capacity and load factors. 
 
 
4.4 Reliability Analysis 
 
Reliability is defined as the ability of a structure or an engineering system to sustain 
successful performance over a certain period of time, e.g.; design life. 
 
In terms of design approach, reliability is no different a process from any other. Both 
prescriptive and performance-based designs can be implemented to perform 
reliability calculations. 
 
Failure can occur whenever the demand, Q, exceeds the capacity, R, any point of 
time during the design life. The probability of failure, Pf, can then be defined as: 
 
( ) ( )xRxQPPf ≤>=    (4.9) 
 
, where x is a dimensionally-consistent random variable common to R and Q.  
 
The reliability or safety set is the complement of the failure set; hence the probability 
of safety, or reliability, Ps, is: 
 
fs PP −= 1      (4.10) 
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The principal focus of reliability analysis is the determination of the probability of 
failure, Pf. If f(x) is defined as a joint probability density function (pdf) of a vector, x, 
of random variables representing demand (Q) and capacity (R), the probability of 







f dfP xx)(     (4.11) 
 
The target of all reliability engineering methods is the computation of the above 
integral. Apart from very few practical problems, neither analytical nor 
computational solutions are conceivable for the above integral in its basic form. It is 
therefore customary to de-convolute the above integral by applying proper 
transformations to normalise and de-correlate the random variables thereof. The 
result is a finite number of independent or multi-normal integrals representing the 











)(x     (4.11-a) 
 
In the last expression, Ω is the set of the intersection of domains of functions, f(xi). In 
performance-based design, the solution is carried out explicitly via direct 
computation of the probability of failure, Pf, using simulation-based methods. 
Prescriptive methods, on the other hand, adopt an implicit approach by using 
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Table-4.2:    Reliability-Oriented Design Methods  
Design approach Order of 
Accuracy 
Qualify as: Remarks 
Optimisation of 
Utility 






Level III Performance-Based 
(with prescribed 




acceptable risk via 
target reliability indices 
Compromise 




or FOSM) & 
Advance Second 
Moment (ASM) 
Level II Prescriptive – 
representative 
moments of random 
variables (e.g.; 
mean and variance) 
used 
Code prescribes 
acceptable risk, but full 
probability distribution 
of variables is not 
considered 
Compromise 
of Level III 
LSD, LRFD, 
ASD or WSD *  
 







Partial Load & 
Resistance factors 
imposed on 
nominal values to 
achieve target 
indices 
Target indices specified 
by codes – No explicit 
probabilistic design – 
FORM or SORM 
applied on generic 
probability distributions 
Compromise 
of Level II 
*  LSD: Limit State Design, LRFD: Load & Resistance Factor Design, ASD: Allowable Stress Design, 
WSD: Working Stress Design 
 
 
In simulation-based methods, computation of the full (or partial) probability space is 
carried out using the classical definition of probability [58, 67]. The integral can be 
evaluated directly by numerical integration or asymptotic expansion [62]or indirectly 
using probabilistic techniques such Monte Carlo simulation [2, 3, 43, 53]. In a Monte 
Carlo analysis, if R is the subset of random variables representing the resistance, and 
Q is that of load, and a pseudo- random set of N analyses of a performance function 










= lim     (4.12) 
 
 
The limit state surface lies at the set where R=Q. The technique is conceptually 
simple but computationally burdensome since a large N (usually one order of 
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magnitude higher than 1/Pf) is needed for an accurate estimate of small values of Pf 
[53, 58]. However, since most failures are observed in the tail region away from the 
mean, variance reduction techniques, such as importance sampling, have been 
developed to confine sampling to the areas of highest likelihood of initiating failure, 
which reduces the number of samples required in the simulation. 
 
Approximate methods target optimum extreme probabilities, so the use of full 
probability functions is not necessary [57]. They are computationally affordable as 
they only use representative moments of probability distributions. Examples are the 
First Order Reliability Method (FORM/FOSM or the Advanced Second Moment, 
ASM) and the Second Moment Reliability Method (SORM) [2, 3, 43, 53]. 
 
4.4.1 The Reliability Index, β 
 
For a vector, x, of basic design variables, the following is arbitrarily defined: g(x) is 
the performance function where g(x) > 0 represents the safe set, g(x) < 0 is the 
failure set and limit state is at g(x)=0.  
 
Formulating a solution for a joint probability distribution for real-life engineering 
problems is practically unfeasible. The alternative approach has therefore been to 
rewrite the basic performance problem in a format where the above formulation 
applies. In essence, x is mapped to u, and as corollary, g(x) is mapped to a mirror 
thereof, say h(u).  
 
If we had a standard normal joint pdf of design variables u, then the probability of 
safety, Ps, can be calculated as Ф (u* ), where Ф is the joint cumulative probability 
density function, CDF of u. By definition, u*  is the number of standard deviations 
from the expected value, E(u), to some point, ui.. The condition for safety is that the 
coordinates of ui are such that the performance function, h(ui) > zero. Let u*  be β. 
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Since β is directly proportional to safety, it is called the reliability or safety index. 
Furthermore, as the purpose of safety analysis is to determine the minimum level of 
safety of a system, the target of reliability calculation is usually βmin. Logically, βmin 
occurs at the boundaries of the safe set; i.e, at h(u) = 0, or the limit state surface. 
 
Appropriate transformations are used to transform the component random values in x 
into a vector of uncorrelated standard normalised variables, u, such that E(u)=0 and 
Cov(u,uT)=I , with E(u), Cov(u,uT) being the expected value and the covariance 
matrix of u, and I  the identity matrix [2, 3, 16, 43, 68]. Since the mean-value point of 
x is mapped into the origin of the transformed variables u, the reliability index is the 
minimum distance from the origin of u to the mirror of the limit state surface in u, 
h(u), as shown in figure 4.3. 
 
0)( subject to   ,minmin === uuu h
Tββ           (4.13) 
 
 
The method of Lagrange’s multipliers can be used to convert the above constrained 
to an unconstrained optimisation problem, and gradient-based optimisation 
techniques usually form the basis of the solution algorithm described in the 
subsequent section. The limit state surface is iteratively approximated around design 
points using Taylor expansion and either the first or the second term of the expansion 
is used depending on whether FORM/FOSM or SORM are implemented. [43, 69] 
Several algorithms exist for solving the above problem, such as Hohenbichler and 
Rackwicz algorithm discussed in the following section [3]. 
 
The above reliability index is known as Hasofer-Lind reliability index, βHL, and is 
reasonably accurate as long as the radius of curvature of the limit state surface is 
sufficiently large compared to βHL.  
 
Hasofer-Lind’s index supersedes earlier formulation by Cornell that produced 
inconsistent β values under equivalent mechanical formulations. Because the 
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approximation was made at the mean values in Cornell’ s method, changes in the 
formulation of the same limit state surface (for example: from Margin = R - Q to 
Margin = R/Q - 1) resulted in inconsistent values for the reliability index , since the 
same mean values of R and Q are used to calculate the first and second moments for 
the Margin in different formulations. In Hasofer-Lind’s case, the calculation of the 
reliability index is that of a geometric distance, which remains consistent since 
mapping variables into another coordinate system does not affect the minimum 
distance from the origin to the limit surface.  
 
Other formulations for a generalised reliability index exist in literature [2, 54] where 
the case is such that the radius of curvature is not large relative to βHL. These 
methods are however computationally intensive and may not be justified since 
simulation techniques have verified the accuracy of βHL for most practical 
applications [2].  
 
The probability of failure, Pf is the complement of the probability of safety, Ps. 
Hence: 
 









β               (4.14) 
 
Due to the approximations in linearization and the use of moments instead of the full 
probability distribution functions, it is more appropriately expressed as: 
 
)( β−Φ≅fP     (4.15) 
 




A direct conclusion of the last formulation is that β is less sensitive than Pf to 
changes of the basic random variables, by virtue of the properties of Ф. It is therefore 
suitable for comparing designs (as in figure 4.4), which has been invaluable to the 























Figure-4.3:  Geometric Representation of Reliability Index, β 









4.4.1.1 Algorithm for Calculating the Reliability Index, β 
 
The following details of the Hohenbichler-Rackwicz algorithm are taken from 
Appendix B.2 of reference [3], apart from the note on the mean values in step 1). The 
Rosenblatt transformation is used to transform non-normal correlated variables to 
uncorrelated standard normal variables. 
 
1- Assume a failure point, oo xx =
* [usually the mean values are used [43]] 
2- Using Rosenblatt transformation, transform the x variables in the original 
space to u variables and obtain the corresponding point in the u-space 
(Appendix B.1 of the same reference). 
































R < Q 
Unsafe region 




DP : Design Point 
g2 (u)=0 
DP, g1 (u) 
DP, g2 (u) 
g1 (u): failure surface for design 1 
g2 (u): failure surface for design 2 
 
Figure 4.4  Comparing Alternative Designs 































































































, evaluated at ox  
 
The partial derivatives can be calculated using implicit differentiation as: 
 
 

























F is the joint cumulative distribution function of the original variables, x 







= 0, the Jacobian would be a lower triangular matrix 
whose inverse can be easily obtained using back substitution. 
 
 
4- Evaluate the performance function and gradient vector at ou : 
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5- Obtain a new failure point: 
 








−=∗ 1  
The corresponding failure point, *x in the x-space (of the original variables), for the 
above point *u can be calculated using first order approximation as: 
 
( )oo uuJxx −+≅ ∗−∗ 1  
 
6- Calculate ( ) 21ouu t∗=β  
7- Using the new failure point, *x , from step 5, repeat steps 2 through 6 until 
convergence of β (βi-1 ≈ βi, i is the number of iteration). 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Sensitivity of the Reliability Index, β 
 
The problem of calculating the reliability index is an optimisation problem as 
detailed in the above two sections, aimed at the minimum value of the reliability 
index since it corresponds the estimate of the maximum probability of failure. The 
failure point in the u-space, *u , corresponds to the minimum value of the reliability 
index, and hence is the most probable failure point. 
 
The coordinates of *u , ( )∗∗∗ nuuu ,,, 21 K  can be related to the reliability index, β, by 
using scalar notation as [3, 6, 43]: 
 
 
β∗∗ −= ii αu         (4.16) 
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where ∗iα  is the vector of direction cosines, 
∗
iu
α , of the scalar distance β along the 
axes ui, and the negative sign appears since 
∗
iα  is in the direction of decreasing h(u) 
[6]. 
 
The individual values, ∗
iu












α  value can be viewed as a proportion of the length of β. The larger 
an ∗
iu
α , the larger its contribution to β, hence they are commonly used as sensitivity 
factors. 
 
The basic design variables, xi, that correspond to small values of 
∗
iu
α  can be used as 
deterministic variables (the mean value may be used) without significant 
compromise on the accuracy of β [2, 68]. 
 
4.4.1.3 Modelling or Prediction Errors in the Reliability Index, β 
 
The calculation of the reliability index amalgamates a range of approximations and 
assumptions. Hence, it itself is a random variable, and it would be unrealistic to 
report a single value from a probabilistic calculation. 
 
A reliability index should be reported with an estimate of the expected error therein. 
The modelling error can be calculated using techniques such that explained in the 
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4.4.2 Interpretation of the Reliability Index, β 
 
Engineer A designs a column with a capacity of 1.2 times the load, but is only 75% 
certain about it. Engineer B designs the same column to a capacity of 1.1 times the 
load and is 93% certain. Whose design is better? 
 
The expected capacity design A is 0.75x1.2 = 0.9 of the load; that of design B is 
0.95x1.1 = 1.02 of the load. Design A fails, while design B is adequate and more 
economical (assuming the knowledge cost is the same). 
 
The central safety factor does not relate to the uncertainty in the design parameters. 
Hence, its use would have made design A (the failure) safer than design B. 
 
Proper assessment requires the examination of the safety margin coupled with 
uncertainty, as shown in the above simple example. The logical candidate that 
describes the relative uncertainty in a random variable is the coefficient of variation, 
COV. The reciprocal of COV is β. Moving from β = 2 to 3 means that we are 1.5 
times more certain of safety; we either increased the capacity, or decreased the 
uncertainty 1.5 times. 
 
For design A, the central factor of safety is 1.2; for B it is 1.1, indicating that A is 
even safer than B. The COV for A is however (uncertainty/(capacity-demand) 
0.25/0.2 = 1.25); for B, it is (0.07/0.1 = 0.7). The reliability indices for A and B are 
0.8 and 1.4 respectively, which reflect that correct ranking. 
 
One of the drawbacks of representing designs in terms of Pf is that changes of the 
basic random variables produce disproportionate changes in the probability of 
failure. On a normal distribution, for example, a shift from 3.0 to 2.0 standard 
deviations from the mean corresponds to a change of probability from 0.0014 to 
0.0228; an increase of almost1500% in Pf.  
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If the central safety factor were 2.0 at 2 standard deviations, it would be difficult to 
relay to a practicing engineer that his designs would have a safety factor of 30 if a 
section with a mean strength 1 standard deviation further is used.  
 
The cause of the problem in the above representation is that calculating Pf from Pf = 
Φ(-β) is practically performed for βmin. Hence the corresponding Pf is the maximum 
Pf. In actual fact, Pf and β are mere predictions, simply as they are the product of 
probabilistic calculations. Real failures have in most cases occurred due to human 
error or unusual extreme conditions. The “real”  Pf is variable; the single value we 
calculate is an estimate of its maximum predicted value. 
 
The correct purpose of representing reliability data is the “expression of certainty”  
about design. One cannot state that a structure is 99% safe. What can be said is that 
one is 99% sure that it would survive the set of rationally predicted loads.  
 
 
4.4.3 Weaknesses of the Reliability index, β 
 
The strength of the reliability index concept lies in that the failure probability can be 
estimated without knowledge of the full probability distributions. The full shape of 
the limit sate function is not needed since linearization is performed only at the 
design points. Depending on the degree of nonlinearity, linearization may yield 
conflicting estimates of the actual probability of failure. Figure 4.5 shows two 
different performance functions with an equal reliability index. 
 




4.5 Load Combination 
 
The stochastic models loads are established using statistics of extremes. Maximum 
load and minimum strength values are modelled using extreme value distributions 
such as Gumbel and Weibull probability distributions. The detailed treatment of this 
class of probability distributions is available in references [2, 3, 5, 70]. 
 
For an N number of loads over a design period, T, the maximum load effect at any 
point of time t, Umax(Q(t)) of loads Qi, can be represented as [71]: 
 














          (4.18) 
 
Static loads can be easily described by random variables since they are almost time 
independent. Transient loads on the other hand are modelled as stochastic or random 
processes. Considerable effort went into the combination of quasi-static loads and 
u1 
u2 








Figure 4.5:  Discrepancy in Estimating Pf from Reliability Index, β 
(Reproduced and modified from reference [3]) 
g2 (u) = 0 
β is equal for both g1 and g2. 
However, it overestimates the 
probability of failure for g1 
and underestimates for g2. 
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loads with a transient nature, by converting time-variant stochastic processes to time-
invariant processes using their extreme value distributions [62]. Outcrossing 
techniques are typically used to extract the extreme value distribution for the 
probability that a stochastic process crosses a level in the time interval (0,T) [54, 62]. 
This is followed by an optimisation process for the maximum effect of point-in-time 




The design period T, is typically 50 years for strength limit states and 10 years for 
serviceability design for building structures [70]. 
 
Reference (Design) Period, T 
Figure 4.6:  Combination of Loads 























Structural Safety and Reliability 
113 
Several statistical studies indicated that the maximum load effect does not occur at 
the coincidence of the peak values of all loads in a combination [5, 13, 71-73]. 
Combining extreme values of loads leads to uneconomical design and may not be 
necessary. A commonly used rule for the linear combination of loads is the 
maximum load-companion load rule, which is based on studies of coincidence of 
loads. The maximum load is assumed to occur at a peak value of one load, Qi, 




jQ :  
 














tQtQMaxQ maxmax        (4.19) 
 
Loads, obviously, interchange roles in peak value, and the combination producing 
the maximum load effect usually governs. 
 
Critics of the above method describe it as inadequate as it ignores cases where the 
maximum combined effect results from a number of loads at values near the peak, 
especially when loads are correlated [5], as in fire following earthquake. However, 
using advanced simulation techniques, the method has been proven to be sufficiently 
accurate for most design situations [5]. 
 
 
4.6 Code Calibration 
 
The main attraction of LSD/LRFD format is its simplicity and appeal to practising 
engineers [3]. It was realised in the early 1990s that the use of level II reliability 
methods in the design office was not practical.[74] LSD and LRFD codes are 
calibrated by enforcing level II reliability methods (FORM & SORM) in level I 
format (Limit State, LRFD, ASD).  
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In practical terms, if the reliability index has been calculated, the most probable 
failure point, *x , would be known. The coordinates of *x contain the basic design 
variables, such as geometry, loads, material properties. The specific load and strength 
variables are also included in *x . The problem of find the load factor, γ, reduces to 
evaluating the ratio of load coordinate of *x  to the nominal value of the load, Qn. 
The same process is used to calculate the strength reduction factors, φ. The nominal 
values of the load and strength, called the characteristic values, are certain quantiles 















=ϕ    (4.20) 
 
In the above equation, γi and Qni are the partial load factor and nominal value for load 
i, and φj and Rnj are the strength reduction factor and nominal strength value for 
strength j. 
 
4.6.1 The Process of Load Calibration  
 
The methods of code calibration fall into three categories: value judgement, fitting 
and code optimisation [54, 74]. 
 
The improvement of quality control procedures resulted in consistent measurements 
of characteristic values for material and dimensional parameters. This consistency 
was taken as an indicator of success of the code in force. For example, values for the 
factor of safety in ASD steel design in the US converged to 5/3 since 1936 [74]. 
Designs using subsequent codes, therefore, were calibrated to achieve the same level 
of safety. This was the standard practice till the 1960s [54]. 
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Fitting takes a reverse approach to that described in the above section. Load and 
resistance factors are pre-selected so as to give the member sizes given by the 
previous code. This methodology was applied in the development of load factors in 
the 1989 AASHTO LRFD specifications for highway bridges [74]. 
 
Load and resistance factors can be used as objective functions under the constraint of 
a reliability index in an optimisation process. This method is known as code 
optimisation. Depending on the format, objective of the code and the choice of target 
reliability indices, a range of load and strength factors are obtained. 
 
A degree of arbitrariness and subjectivity exist, particularly in the selection of code 
formats and reliability indices, hence the variation of different national and regional 
codes. 
 
The above approach was used in the development of the 1977 Canadian code for 
buildings [54] and the 1982 ANSI A58.1 Load Code [74]. More details are available 
in references [2, 53, 54, 74, 75]. 
 
Load and resistance factors, γ and φ, may be visualised as probability density 
functions, pdf, of the quotient of the load  and resistance by their respective nominal 
values. The aim of the optimisation process becomes the specific values of γ and φ 
that correspond to the target reliability index, βt. The basic variables in performance 
function, g(x) are segregated into a product of the nominal load and resistance values 
by partial load and resistance factors. 
 
       ),()( QRx gg =           (4.21) 
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),(),( nn QRgg λϕ=QR                         (4.21-a) 
 
The optimisation process becomes straightforward:  
 
 ),(),()( nn QRggg λϕ== QRx  
 Minimise ),( nn QRg λϕ  subject to a target reliability index βt 
 
 
The same logic can be followed in the formulation of a probability-based single 
factor of safety that achieves similar reliability indices [3]. 
 
4.7 Maintenance of Code through Quality Control 
 
Successful engineering practice necessitates the application of a strict regime of 
quality control procedures. If sample describing the characteristic strength of 
materials deviate appreciably from the domain used in code development, the 
validity of the code is compromised. 
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A number of techniques employing statistical and probabilistic concepts are used in 
acceptance of samples. These are collectively called acceptance sampling techniques 
[21]. 
 
Acceptance sampling by attributes is one technique where a sample of the total is 
selected and tested. The test results in a good or bad classification, and the total is 
rejected if a specified proportion of the sample is bad. The number of rejected items 
in the sample can be used to infer the probability of accepting the total. 
 
The above sampling sets a threshold for acceptance which disregards the actual 
distance from the acceptance limit. Yield strength measurements of 238, 239 and 240 
MPa would be good while 233 and 234 MPa would be bad if the acceptance limit is 
235 MPa. An alternative method that accounts for the actual weights of the 
measurements is the acceptance sampling by variables. The actual measurements are 
analysed and their statistical data (such as the mean and variance) are compared to 
acceptable standard data. The total is accepted if the sample data compares well with 
the standard data. This method requires a smaller number of samples than sampling 
by attributes, since the whole data is analysed as opposed to counting good or bad 
items. More details and examples can be found in references [2, 21]. 
 
Sampling procedures are the scope of construction and quality control standards and 
form part of quality certification requirements. 
 
4.8 Load Combination for Structural Fire Design 
 
The appeal of LSD and LRFD format to practicing engineers has been a main driver 
for shaping the current design codes. If codes are not practical, they’re not usable. It 
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is therefore desirable to aim to include the fire effect on structures as another load 
type within the existing LSD/LRFD format. 
 
Realistic combination of different loads depends on the history of their co-
occurrence. Methods such as the load coincidence (LC) [72] method are derivatives 
of the latter concept. 
 
A study of the coincidence of various loads, such as gravity and wind loads, 
concluded that fire need not to be combined with most loads due to the low 
probability of their coincidence [13]. More details are in section 3.3.2.1 of chapter 3. 
 
The scope of the above study is limited to deciding whether or not it is reasonable to 
combine fire with another load. It acknowledges that more extensive analysis is 
required in the assessment of the structural behaviour under fire, but stops short of 
providing details on the actual analysis under combined loading. 
 
4.8.1 The Fire Problem 
 
In traditional load combination, the ability to lump loads in linear combinations is 
attributed to the linear elastic static response of the structure. Controls are placed so 
that the maximum expected stress levels do not result in significant deformations 
beyond which linear analysis becomes invalid. By evading nonlinearity and 
precluding time from the explicit formulation, the influence of the whole structure on 
the behaviour of single members is reduced to the level where linear analysis 
methods can be applied with sufficient accuracy. As a result, single members can be 
designed individually to linear combinations of static loads. Ingenious and 
convenient; this type of analysis applies to the majority of structure classes 
encountered in the design office. It is also commensurate with the level of education 
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offered at first degree courses in most universities. The success of LSD/LRFD in 
practice is behind the desire to extend the same treatment to fire action. 
 
A beautiful term describes the ranking of elements in galvanic series. Elements that 
assume the anode role sacrifice themselves to protect cathodes and are therefore 
called “noble” . Those becoming cathodes within the reactive environment are “ less 
noble” . 
 
Codes specify a hierarchy of target reliability indices depending on the member’s 
mode of response. Tension members, for example, have lower reliability indices than 
compression members since they usually fail in yielding. Yielding takes place over a 
reasonable period of time which gives sufficient warning and allows rescue and 
mitigation. By specifying different target reliability indices, codes aim at initiating 
the failures in tension members (the noble) so as to allow time to protect other parts 
of the structure (the less noble). 
 
Fire presents a unique counterintuitive problem in structural design. Code-favourable 
elements can become less noble in the response hierarchy. Members tend to 
interchange roles in the resistance chain due to the effect of nonlinearity. Tension 
members can be the last to lose any resistance as heat amplifies elongation thereby 
relieving applied forces or causing them to buckle prematurely due to their large 
slenderness. Buckling at early heating stages reduces the chances of developing 
significant plastic strains, so they are likely to regain capacity as they return to shape 
in the cooling stage.  
 
Compression members suffer as the heat-induced elongation induces pre-stress that 
increases the compression stiffness, thereby attracting extra loading. Slender 
compression members exhibit good performance during cooling as the heat loss 
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imposes a straightening effect, while short compression members can undergo 
irrecoverable plastic strains that degrade their capacity [76]. 
 
Tests have also shown the significance of restraint effect on the behaviour of 
structural elements [7, 77-80]. Figure 4.8 shows the variation of the behaviour of a 
composite beam with and without axial restraint. Any treatment of uncertainty in a 
probabilistic design framework must allow for the bifurcation exhibited after certain 
temperatures, which suggests a range of load factors rather than a single value. It also 
highlights the necessity for a holistic analysis of the structure in assessing the 
behaviour of individual elements, since the transformation in the beam behaviour is 




Moreover, the heating regime has a significant impact on the stresses induced in the 
structure. It is difficult to construct rules for the use of short-hot or long cool fires in 
Figure 4.8: Runaway behaviour of a composite floor beam 
(Reproduced from reference [9]) 
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structural design, since it is not possible to assess the impact of the specific fire 
without including the restraint effects of the particular structure.  
 
The framework of LSD/LRFD codes is centred on combining a multitude of 
stochastic load processes, using a procedure that eliminates time from the design 
equation. There are two problems in applying this approach to fire. One is that the 
constraints (such as maximum deflection or stress) are dependent on time in fire 
since they influence evacuation, and the second is that the performance of other 
active and passive fire engineering systems is measured in time.   
 
In fire, permanent damage to the structure is most likely inevitable. The functional 
requirement of the structure is the control of the temporal rate of damage. Since 
repair is expected after fire, the extent to which the structure may deform is relaxed. 
The only constraint on deformations is that they evolve at a rate that does not impede 
evacuation or progress to collapse. The acceptance criterion for structural 
performance is directly linked to the functional requirements for evacuation and is a 
function of the fire evolution. 
 
Another fundamental difference between fire and other loads is caused by 
nonlinearity. Spatial properties, connection details, relative stiffness and heating 
regime, all play a major role in the behaviour of structures in fire. Whereas a beam 
remains a beam with the variation of service loading, it might transform into a 
catenary under fire.  
 
4.8.2 Anatomy of Fire Protection Systems 
 
The interrelationship between the components of fire protection systems, active and 
passive, can be used to build an event tree diagram for potential fire scenarios. 
Statistics exists for the performance of the various fire protection components. The 
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
 122 
consequence of the events can be integrated into the failure tree to extract the risk 
associated with each scenario. 
 
Good engineering design utilises the event tree to attain equal or near-equal risks for 
all possible scenarios. The design as such would be directed into optimising the use 
of different systems in the most economical manner. It is essentially a simple 
optimisation process that has a uniform target reliability index for all design 
alternatives. 
 
As an example, the structural capacity during fire can be modelled as a standby 
component when using passive structural fire protection. If the passive fire protection 
is eliminated, the structural capacity becomes part of the overall fire protection 
system. By examining the risk with and without passive protection, the actual value 
of having passive fire protection can be estimated. 
 
If the maximum risk for the whole fire safety system (on any branch of the failure 
tree) is greater than that without passive protection, the latter may be, and in fact 
should be eliminated. An example event tree diagram for the progression of fire 
beyond origin is shown in figure 4.9. 
 




The resultant probabilities of the outcomes shown on the fault tree can be easily 








Fire Breaches External Wall NO Suppression at Initial Floor 
AND OR 
LOGIC 
Fire Spreads beyond 
Initial Floor 
Flame Spread on 
Wall Surface 
Fire Breaks Windows 
on Next Floor 




t_fire 1 ≥  ∑∆t 1-n 
An INHIBIT gate indicates that an output is possible 
if the input(s) occur AND a condition is satisfied 
Figure 4.9:  Fault Tree Example for Fire Progression to Next Floors 
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4.8.3 A Proposal for an LSD/LRFD Fire Effect Combination  
 
The recipe for LSD/LRFD includes the coincidence of loading described above [13] 
with time-independent loads and response models. This may be achieved by defining 
bounds of member behaviour during fire, thereby subdividing the response of 
members according to the prevalent mode. For example, in Figure 4.8 above, beams 
can be designed for two stages: 
 
1. During egress and evacuation: Maximum deflection is limited to L/30. 
Hence, for the above specific beam, the maximum steel temperature within 
egress time can be checked, and if need be, either beam redesigned or passive 
protection applied. 
2. After egress and evacuation: No limit on maximum deflection or stress levels 
as long as structural response does not induce total collapse. 
 
The resistance is a function of the section and material properties, geometry and 
boundary conditions. The demand comes from the magnitude and duration of the 
heat flux imposed on structural members. This depends on the compartment 
geometry, fuel and ventilation conditions. 
 
For stage 1, a performance function can be constructed as the difference between 
limiting temperature and actual steel temperature. 
 
actualsteellimiting TTg −−=)(x    (4.22) 
 
Extreme probability distributions of the maximum limiting temperature before 
runaway (Tlimiting) and the maximum actual steel temperature can be derived. 
Temperatures can then be statistically correlated to the stress and strain levels of 
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different steel sections. The idea is to use maximum stress as surrogate for 
temperature. By using its maximum value distribution, time becomes implicit and 
LSD/LRFD formats may be used to combine the fire with other loads. The behaviour 
during the above stage is nearly linear, so fits well within the framework of 
LSD/LRFD.  
 
The stress and strain levels corresponding to the actual steel temperatures are then 
used to back-calculate an equivalent static load with a suitable load factor. Those 
corresponding to the limiting temperatures can be used to compute the resistance 
reduction factor. Again this needs be performed within a strict framework of building 
types, geometry and boundary conditions. 
 
Stage 2 can be implemented as an independent check for structural stability.  Usmani 
et al [9] proposed a simple method for calculated pull-in forces on columns during 
fire. The main strength of method is derived from the fact that time is precluded from 
its formulation. The additional checks suggested in [9] can be made implicit by using 
a system of building classes and defining characteristics that ensure the validity of its 
application. The characteristics most influential to the behaviour are by-products of 
the sensitivity analysis associated with reliability computations. 
 
4.9 Per formance Functions for Structural Fire Design &  Response Surface 
Modelling 
 
Often is the case that most performance functions in structural fire modelling are 
nonlinear dynamic finite element models. Simplified calculation models exist, but 
they are not suited for complex structures where performance-based design has been 
opted for. 
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Running a reliability analysis using direct simulation techniques or FOSM/SORM 
involves calculating the performance function at every design point in the iteration. 
Certainly in the case of analysing structures for fire effects, the computational effort 
involved in a single analysis of a moderate size structure can be in the order of days 
on an ordinary personal computer. To provide a meaningful reliability estimate, a 
large number of simulations is needed. It may therefore be impractical to link a 
reliability model to a finite element model, especially that most computers used in 
design offices are typical PC’s. 
 
Response surface modelling is a viable technique that can be used to circumvent the 
repetitive calculation of g(x) at the design points [53, 81]. It could therefore be a 
more reasonable approach to reliability calculations for structures in fire. 
 
Since the value of g(x) is only relevant at the design point in FOSM/SORM 
calculations, the idea is to substitute the original g(x) with a function that is simpler 
and accurate enough at the design point. The principle is to evaluate g(x) at 
arbitrarily selected points, and to use these values to fit a function, say gR(x), thereto. 
The substitute function, gR(x), is an n
th order polynomial, most commonly of the 
second order [53]. The reliability calculations proceed by evaluation of the design 
point and reliability index using gR(x). An improved response surface may be 
obtained by sampling points close to the design point just obtained, and new 
reliability index and design point can be calculated. The procedure can be repeated 
until convergence to a design point and reliability is achieved [81]. 
 
4.10 A Proposed Risk-based Target Reliability Index for  Performance-Based 
Design 
 
Several models have been proposed for including the cost of failure in the overall 
project cost.  
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One such proposal is: [82] 
 
( ) [ ] iiiiiii FpSECpIL +−+= 1    (4.23) 
 
In the above: 
 
Li: The expected total cost 
Ii: Initial cost 
pi: Probability of occurrence of total failure 
Fi: The estimated cost of total failure, including structural failure and any 
associated losses 
Ci: The estimated cost of partial failure 
E[Si]: The probability of occurrence of partial failure 
 
The probability of total failure is statistically very small and hence it can be set to 
zero [82]. Moreover, past total building failures were accepted as due to exceptional 
events that could not be avoided by design. The above equation becomes: 
 
[ ] iiii CSEIL +=      (4.23-a) 
 
Equation 4.23-a can be generalised to include the running cost, Ri, as: 
 
[ ] iiiii RSECIL ++=      (4.23-b) 
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The use of performance-based design requires a parallel risk framework that has a 
commensurate flexibility. It should be possible to vary the acceptable probability of 
failure depending on the actual risk level. Current probability-based codes deal with 
the probability part of the risk and set target reliability indices accordingly. A more 
complete treatment should include the consequence of events. This has been used 
successfully in earthquake engineering in the US, and is behind the methodologies 
developed by the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER).  
 
Good design should aim at a uniform risk due to all predicted events. This is the 
underlying principle in the risk comparison method detailed in chapter 3. 
 
From chapter 3, (equations 3.6 and 3.7) 
 







CP =     (4.24-a) 
 
In the above, Rref and Ri are the reference risk and risk under consideration, P and C 
are the respective probability and consequence of events. The ratio of public 
acceptance of a risk under investigation, Ri, to the reference risk, Rref is v. 
 
The reference risk should be taken as an involuntary risk, whose probability of 
occurrence is beyond human control.  
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For structural damage assessment, the consequences Cref and Ci can be replaced by 
target damage indices, DTref and Di. 
 
The maximum acceptable values of the damage indices, Dref and Di are set by the 
functional requirements of the building during the event. These obviously vary from 
one event to another. The maximum deformation during fire is different from that 
during an earthquake. Additionally, the principal function of the building depends on 
the event. During an earthquake, the building is the “safe refuge”  and people have no 
time to escape. In fire, on the other hand, the building becomes a “safe egress route”  
that must allow people to leave safely. 
 
The most important conclusion from the last paragraph is that Dref and Di are specific 
to each building. They would vary to ensure that the building performs its intended 
function during the event. 
 
A risk-based target reliability index for event i, βTi, can be obtained by rewriting 
















11β     (4.25) 
 
The above index is specific to the building and ensures consistent risk levels. It is 
therefore suitable for performance-based design. 
 
The projected total cost can be calculated using equation 4.23-b as follows: 
 
( ) iiTii RDIL i +−Φ+= β     (4.25-a) 
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Chapter 6 presents a method for quantifying structural damage. 
 
4.11 A Proposed Optimisation Technique for Calculating the Reliability 
Index 
 
The calculation described in section 4.4.1 for the reliability index described is a 
gradient-based technique. The algorithm tracks the most probable point, u, by 
minimising the angle between the vector, u, and the unit vector normal to the 




The termination criterion for the algorithm is the convergence of β which is marked 
by angle θ approaching zero. 
 
The main problem in the above approach is that the algorithm stops at a minimum, 
without knowing whether it is a local or global minimum. If g(u) has multiple 
u2 
Figure 4.10: Iterations to Calculate βmin  





βmin is reached when θ→0 
 
g(u)=0 
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minima, they are unlikely to be detected. Moreover, the detected minimum is the first 
minimum encountered along the trajectory, so it depends of the choice of the starting 




The following is a proposed method for capturing extrema, minima and maxima. The 
concept is explained with the aid of the following figures, using a two-variable 
performance function.  
 
Two circles with centre at the origin of u1u2 are drawn, as in figure 4.12. The radii r1 
and r2 are arbitrary. 
u2 
Figure 4.11:   Performance Function with Multiple Minima  
u1 
βmin-1 
P1 is detected, but P2 not 
 










The distances S1 and S2 determine the direction of the minimum distance from 
g(u1,u2) to the origin. The point where the distance S is nearly zero occurs at the 
minimum radius, r3, and is the minimum reliability index, βmin. 
 
The same procedure applies for multidimensional surfaces. The calculation starts at 
an arbitrary plane, i1i2 say, and the minimum distance is calculated as above. The 
closest point to the origin of i1i2 (P3 in the above figure) becomes the starting point 
for the calculation in the i2i3 plane; i.e., the centre of circle-1-i2i3. The same 





Figure 4.12:   Capturing βmin using Circles 
u2 
u1 
r3 = βmin 
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The method has the following advantages: 
 
 Simple algorithm – Start at one point on g(u) = 0 and search for the points on the 
circle where g(u)=0, stop search when you return to the starting point. Repeat 
for second circle. If S2 < S1, then r3 < r2. Start circle 3 and continue drawing 
circles until S → zero. 
 The choice of starting point is not important since the algorithm follows a circle. 
 Because it follows the circle, it is guaranteed to converge since it must return to 
starting point. 
 Easy to capture any number of design points. Multiple points are detected by 
the number of intersection points. (Points P3 and P4 in figure 4.12-a). Using 
regression analysis, these points can be used to construct a response surface 




Figure 4.12-a:   Detecting Multiple Design Points 
u2 
u1 
r3 = βmin-1 
r4 = βmin-2 
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 The relative difference between S1 and S2 with respect to r1 and r2 gives an 










The above can be utilised in estimating the difference in radii, ∆r, to accelerate 
convergence. It can also be useful in estimating the error in calculating the 
probability of failure, Pf, from the reliability index, β. Figure 4.12-b illustrates 




























Figure 4.12-b:   Estimating the Error in Pf 
u2 
u1 
Hatched area is 
an estimate of 
the error in pf. 
g (u1, u2)= 0 
r3 
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The method can be used with circular or near-circular performance functions. A 




4.12  Conclusion 
 
The assessment of risk is as complex a process as risk itself. It is unfeasible to carry 
it out without making significant compromise to risk parameters. 
 
The primary objective of risk analysis for engineering projects is the calculation of 
the probability and consequence of events, including failures. Other aspects of risk 
such as social impact are taken into account qualitatively, primarily due to their 
subjective nature. 
 
Probabilistic techniques in engineering were introduced with a main focus on 
reliability. The structural response to elevated temperatures exhibits strong 
nonlinearity and the acceptability limits for deformations are dependent on time. The 
two features place restriction on the applicability of limit state or LRFD format to 
structural design for fire effects. A proposal for the design for fire effects using a 
two-stage approach was presented. 
 
Reliability calculations are essentially optimisation processes of performance 
functions under the constraint of target reliability indices. Current level I codes 
(LSD/LRFD, ASD) are calibrated using subjectively- selected reliability indices. The 
flexibility inherent in performance-based design is its main distinguishing 
characteristic. The choice of target reliability indices can be improved by 
incorporating the risk involved in the specific project. A simple method for a risk-
based target reliability index was also introduced.  
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Finite element method (FEM) is the preferred tool for analysis of structures for fire 
conditions which is characterised by a nonlinear behaviour. Reliability computations 
can be almost unfeasible if commonly used algorithms are linked to FEM 
simulations. Response surface models are a reasonable alternative that can be used 
for reliability calculation. 
 
The use of gradient optimisation techniques in level II reliability algorithms poses 
limitations on the ability to capture multiple failure points. An optimisation method 











Limit State Design in Practical Situations: 
Is your Structure Safe Enough? 
 
Engineering design is carried out mostly by commercially driven organisations. The 
design office is managed through a process of optimisation that allocates resources in 
proportion to the forecast benefit. Like any practice, engineering design is regulated 
by law. Legal requirements, nonetheless, set minimum performance standards for a 
wide range of applications, but do not necessarily capture every foreseeable situation.  
 
Structural engineers often find themselves part of a design delivery process which is 
limited in time and budget. The main aim of conventional practice is to meet the 
client’s brief while satisfying the building regulations. In general, it is deemed 
sufficient to ensure that design complies with the applicable codes and standards. As a 
matter of tradition, expert code writers carry the onus of mapping elaborate load-
structure behaviour to straightforward design formulation. Therefore, the task of the 
engineer is truncated to collating actions in code-specific formats and ensuring that 
resistances exceed their respective effects. 
 
This chapter examines some common design situations where reliability differs for 
members of the same type in the same structure. 
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5.1 Acceptance Criteria - Time Scale and Failure Modes 
 
Natural systems pursue minimum energy content. When a system is perturbed by an 
applied action or change of conditions, elements deform in the mode dissipating the 
maximum energy. If a number of deformation modes are physically possible, the 
system would pursue the mode with the highest capacity for energy disposal. 
 
Depending on the geometric characteristics and boundary conditions, elements 
dissipate internal energy through either ductile modes such as elongation or 
deflection, or brittle modes as in fracture or buckling. 
 
In a similar manner to natural systems, structures favour the brittle option having the 
higher rate of energy disposal. On the hand, design codes and designers favour ductile 
failure modes. Failures of the latter type progress over an observable period of time, 
thereby providing warning of imminent risk and allowing emergency operations and 
remedial works. This is the reason codes assign lower safety indices to members 
exhibiting ductile failures in an attempt to initiate failure therein. 
 
A necessary condition for the validity of the code approach is optimality. The fact that 
actions on structures are mostly natural and modelled by random processes, optimum 
design can only be achieved from a continuous space of solutions. In engineering 
design, however, it is impractical to use different sections for similar members with 
relatively small difference in forces. In fact, the feasibility of optimisation is largely 
hampered by industry-standard discrete sets of available materials, as in standard steel 
and timber sections. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, time is the main element in failure acceptance criteria. The 
ability to impose sufficient control on failure development can only be assessed using 
time scale. Structural codes are written with the aim to guide structural failure to a 
path that can be monitored and assessed within available resources. Failures that 
cannot be observed occur without warning and mitigation efforts can be seriously 
hindered. The below generic formulation illustrates the concept. 























5.2 Structural Failure Modes 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, failures generally fall in the two categories: 
 
 Ductile failures: Failures that are progressive at macro-scale, exhibiting an 
observable history of deformation or degradation parameters. A typical 
example is yielding of a tension member. 
 
 Brittle failures:  Failure is characterised by non-observable history of 
deformation or degradation parameters. These are mainly two types: 
microscopic failures as in fracture and stability failures like buckling. 
 
Despite the rigour in reliability methods, account for the consequence of failure is still 
subjective [53]. Table-5.1 shows typical values of the reliability index used in the 
AISC-LRFD specifications.[64] It is clear that target reliability indices differentiate 
between ductile and brittle failures. The intention of differentiation is to impose a 
degree of control on structures in an attempt to instigate failure in ductile modes. 
 
Table 5.1  A Sample of Target Reliability indices, βt, used in AISC LRFD 
Code for Ln / Dn = 1.0 (Ln & Dn are Nominal Live & Dead Loads) [64] 
Type of Element Target Reliability Index, βt 
Tension Member, yield limit state 
Tension Member, Fracture limit state 
3.0 
4.1 
Rolled Beam, flexure limit state 
Rolled Beam, shear limit state 
2.5 - 2.8 
3.4 
Columns 2.7 – 3.6 
Fillet Welds 4.4 
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5.3 What is wrong with LSD/LRFD Codes? 
 
Nothing is wrong with LSD/LRFD! The format of codes was designed with the 
engineering office practice in mind. The extent of rigour required in code documents 
was influenced by many factors, such as the general level of education of designers, 
the characteristics of common building types and the record of past design 
specifications. Earlier codes such as the working stress design (WSD) had a simpler 
format backed by an impressive success record. Code committees came to an 
agreement in the 1990s [74] that level II reliability methods were to be implicitly 
applied in LSD/LRFD format. 
 
The foundation of LSD/LRFD is based on the ability to superimpose different actions 
in linear static combinations. Such approach enabled the continued application of 
member-based design and was welcomed by practising engineers. Allowance for the 
consequence of failure is treated by separate prescriptive provisions such as 
recommendations for sufficient redundancy and alternative load paths. The provision 
for a minimum tensile capacity for connections is steel buildings in BS 5950-1, 2000 
is an example of the latter. It is intended to ensure adequate connection resistance if 
the member becomes subject to membrane-like forces during collapse. This type of 
structural behaviour is typical in fire conditions. 
 
Many practicing engineers realised the importance of global structural treatment, but 
were forced to use judgement and intuition in the absence of rational code guidance. 
Fazlur-Rahman Khan and El Nemieri [83] highlighted the need to advance structural 
codes to a stage where the relative significance of members to the global structural 
integrity is incorporated in the design formula. Using the same rationale behind 
reducing column loads in multi-storey buildings, Khan and El Nemieri suggested that 
designers modify the strength reduction factor, φ, to account for redundancy or 
uniqueness of structural elements. Though not explicitly proclaimed, the authors’  
suggestion could have well marked an early adoption of performance-based design 
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codes. Moses [84] investigated the failure mechanisms of parallel and series 
structural systems verifying the variability of the partial safety factor with merely the 
number of elements in a structural system. 
 
5.4 System Reliability 
 
Failure of a member within a structure does not necessarily result in collapse of the 
whole structure. Structural systems are usually designed to account for the eventuality 
of partial failures by redistributing loads to other members. 
 
Structural systems are not unlike other engineering systems. They can be idealised to 
identify the impact of failure of individual members on the global structure. 
 
5.4.1 Reliability of Series &  Parallel Structural Assemblies 
 
In simple terms, parallel systems can be described as those that share the demand, as 
in rowers in a regatta. Series systems on the other hand relay the full demand from one 
to another; as in relay races, transport systems generally or chains, as shown in figure 
5.1. It logically follows that the capacity of parallel systems is the collective capacity 
of all members, whereas that of series systems limited by the smallest capacity of any 
individual member, or the weakest link.  
 




It is unlikely that any engineering system is designed without allowance for the failure 
of one or more components. For the purpose of this discussion, we shall call the 
system of components that represent the minimum requirements for operation without 
allowance for partial failure as the base system.  
 
If a system of components is an optimally designed base system, then whether the 
components are in parallel or series, failure would occur upon the loss of any 
individual member. The main difference between the two is the mode of failure. 
Series systems lose total capacity at the instant of failure. Parallel systems on the 
other hand undergo a transition state where the additional demand propagates through 
the remaining components. Should the demand diminish or the capacity be enhanced, 
progressive failure can be halted. 
 
Owing to its collective property, parallel systems provide designers with the ability to 
utilise parallel redundancy. By either enhancing the individual capacities of some 
(not necessarily all) components, or inserting additional ones, the system can be 
designed to operate following the failure of any number of components. The design of 
aircraft engines involves contingency for possible failure of one or more engines. 






Parallel Electric Circuits Series System 
Figure 5.1: Examples of Parallel and Series Systems 
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since the anticipated time of such conditions is limited. During normal service, 
engines operate at a proportion of the capacity to maintain acceptable performance for 
the length of the design life [56].  Parallel systems can also encompass standby 
systems where the added components are idle during normal service. 
 



















   (5.1-a) 
 
When the failure conditions of members of the parallel system are mutually exclusive, 










_     (5.1-b) 
 
The upper bound of the probability of failure for a parallel system is the failure 
probability of any single component. 
 
Failures of all members in a series system are fully positively correlated since the 
failure of any member induces the failure of the remaining members. The survival of 
members on the other hand, is independent from other members. The lower bound for 
the probability of failure is therefore the largest failure probability of any single 
member. The upper bound is the complement of the survival set of all members, i.e.; 
the systems fails if not all members survive. The survival necessitates the survival of 
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all members of the series; hence the survival or safe set, L-safe-series, is the intersection 




iseriessafe gL 0>=−−    (5.2) 
 




iseriessafe gL 01 >−=−−    (5.2-a) 
 
The upper bound for the probability of failure of a series system is [3, 43, 56, 68, 85]: 
 
_seriessurvivalseriesf PP −=1_    (5.3) 
 
The above result can be generalised by straightforward deduction from of Figure 5.2 
to: 
 
      xx dfP
ig






   (5.3-a) 
 
For a series of discrete members, the probability of survival and failure, Psurvival and Pf, 









_    (5.3-b) 
 
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
 145
 
































































Members, m1, m2 and m3  
in series 
m1  m2  m3  




Members, m1, m2 and m3  
in parallel 
Survival Set: U 0>ig   




I I )0()0()0( 321 >>> ggg
U U )0()0()0( 321 >>> ggg
gi is performance function of  
member, mi. Functions g1, g2 
and g3  are the same for series 
and parallel cases in this figure. 
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It is easily seen from Figures 5.2 that parallel systems offer greater safety than series 
systems under similar performance conditions. The extra safety is the additional area 
offered by any one member; i.e. area below any of the performance functions g1, g2 or 
g3. This is further illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
 
Purely series systems cannot be theoretically designed with any binary redundancy; 
i.e.; if members are either perfectly operational or failed, then adding members to the 
series to make it longer does not enhance its overall reliability. The capacity of the 
weakest member or members must be amplified to allow for any margin of tolerance.  
 
5.4.2 Redundant Systems 
 
When a system contains a component that is idle during normal operation conditions, 

















































Safety Difference between Parallel and Series Systems   
 




Figure 5.3 Difference of Safety between Series and Parallel Systems  
I I )0()0()0( 321 >>> ggg
Risk-Based Design of Structures for Fire 
 147
 
definition is quite oversimplified since the components many engineering 
systems are quite interrelated and contain some reserve capacity. 
 
Regardless of the particular mechanism of load or demand redistribution, redundancy 
exists if the demand can be sustained after partial failure for a specified period of 
time. 
 
In probabilistic terms, providing alternative routes translates into displacing the failure 
bounds in the negative direction; i.e., the lower and upper bounds of the failure 
probability are decreased. 
 
The series systems of figure 5.4 are taken as examples. Assume that the failures of all 
members are statistically independent. Then, the lower bound of the probability of 
failure for the system, m1-m3, is: 
 
( ) ( )32131 ,,maxmin mfmfmfmmf pppP −−−−− =        (5.5) 
 
Assume that Pf-min(m1-m3) is Pf-m2; that is m2 is the weakest link. It is decided to 
supplement m2 with a standby member, m4 that is activated if m2 fails. Therefore, the 
system would fail in the region of m2 and m4 only if both fail. The lower bound of the 
probability of failure for the system becomes: 
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And Pfmin of the series is decreased since, 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]424242 mPmPmmPmANDmP ffff ×=∩=      (5.5-b) 
 
A calculation for the upper bound should yield a similar trend since the survival of the 




It is evident from the above analyses that series systems are more sensitive to failure 
events than parallel systems, and are likely to fail with little if any warning. This 
knowledge should be utilised while designing series-type structural systems such 
vertical wall bracing, or columns in multi-storey buildings. 
 
Enhancing the capacity of some members in a series has been successfully used to 
hinder failure propagation. In the United States, power transmission towers are 
designed for “security loads”  [86, 87]. One in every 10 to 20 transmission towers in a 
series is designed to withstand the effect of failure of intermediate towers, thereby 
preventing domino-like (cascading) progressive collapse, albeit that the principal 
function of power transmission is disrupted. Figure-5.5 illustrates the concept. 
Members, m1, m2 
and m3  in series 
m1  m2  m3  
Members, m1, m2 
and m3  in series with 
a standby member, 
m4, in case m2 fails 
Figure 5.4 Series and Redundant Systems 
m4  
m1  m2  m3  





5.4.3 Reliability of Damaged Structures 
 
The probability that a structure fails after damage can be easily modelled using 
conditional probability rules. If an event A, results in damage, DA, the probability of 
the development of damage, DB, due to a subsequent or correlated event, B, can be 
expressed as:  
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]ABPADPAPBDP AB =][              (5.6) 
 
 
If an intermediate tower fails, the security tower 
withstands the induced tension and transfers it to its 
foundations thus preventing it from progressing to 
the next series. 
Service Condition 
Failure Condition Zero Force 
from Collapse 





transferred to Foundation 
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5.4.4 System Reliability Index 
 
The reliability index of any system type can be calculated using the basic relationship: 
 
)1(1 systemfsystem P −
− −Φ=β           (5.7) 
 
The minimum Pf-system is obviously the value of most interest. 
 
Example – 1 
 
The failure of a chain is governed by its weakest link. The longer the chain is, the 
higher its probability of failure. Timber members are a traditional example where 
chain-like failure mode applies [88]. The reduction in their strength is a function of 
timber defects (knots, etc) which generally increase as the length of the member 
increases. Two beams of different length will therefore have different probabilities of 










The probability of failure of 
Beam-2 (the longer beam) is 
greater than Beam-1 since 
the number of knots is 
greater, although they have 
the same section, and are 
subject to the same forces. 
Figure 5.6  Probability of Failure versus Beam Length 
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 Example - 2 
 
A bracing system incorporating tension & compression members is shown in Figure-
5.7. The elements in the individual bays are assumed of equal stiffness and therefore 
share the load equally. The shown structure represents a parallel system. The 
compression member was optimised. Since wind can act in any two opposite 
directions of any arbitrary plane, the designer has had to upgrade the tension member 
to the same section of the compression member. With properly-designed connections, 
the tension member is assumed to fail in yielding (β = 3.0). The compression member 




The above inevitable upgrade yields a realised reliability index for the tension 
member of a minimum of 3.6. 
6.3≥tensionβ  
 
The critical compressive stress can reach the yield stress in a purely hypothetical 
condition when the slenderness ratio, r







Compression Member – 
At optimum design Tension Member – 
Upgraded to the same 
section of the 
Compression member 




Figure  5.7: Example of a Bracing System  
Wind Load can act in 
any direction 
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If the realised reliability index, β_ compression, is equal to 3.6, β_tension would be greater 
than 3.6, since the tension member does not buckle and therefore has a larger 
capacity. 
6.3,6.3  If >⇒= tensionncompressio ββ  
 
The last equation indicates that the compression member is the more likely to fail 
before the tension member. 
 
Example – 3 
 
A structural steel multi-storey frame for an office building is designed for a governing 
load combination of Dead + Imposed load (DL + LL). Since the overall height of the 
internal column is just under12m, the designers opted for a uniform section for the 
entire height. The design has thus simplified the connection details and insured the 
same beam length and details throughout all three floors. The saving in detailing, 
fabrication and erection outweighs the slight increase in column weights. Should the 
client accept the upgrade? 





Assuming that the column is a short column, β can be taken as 2.7, and applies to the 
ground floor section that is presumably optimised for the maximum load. 
 
The column section at the second floor carries 1/3 of the ground floor column load. 
For the purposes of this example, typical values of the mean and variance for dead 







load on column 
increases 
Figure 5.8: Code Objective contradicted by Unifying Column Section 
Column C - Same Column 
Section throughout   
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Load Bias factor ,λ   
(λ = Mean, µQ  / Nominal) 
Coefficient of Variation, 
COV 
Dead 1.05 0.10 
Live Load  1.0 0.25 
 
 










COVDL = 0.1, and COVLL = 0.25 
DLDLQDLDL λµσ 1.01.0 ==⇒  





















We also have, 
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 The offset between µQ and 3
Qµ is Qµ32 , which corresponds to a number of 






















The reliability index for the second floor column is 2.7 + 3.91 = 6.61, compared to 2.7 
of the ground floor column. 
 
5.5 What can Engineers do to Complement LSD/LRFD Designs? 
 
The design situations in the above examples are frequently encountered in practice. 
An understanding of the basic principles of reliability design can help engineers 
improve safety of structures. 
 
Safety can be increased by reducing uncertainty. A simple application of this principle 
can be used to deal with the situations described in the above examples. Uncertainty 
can be reduced by imposing more stringent quality control procedures on the more 
important elements.  
 
Some simple qualitative procedures are cheap and very efficient. In the above cases, 
an engineer would request more thorough check for wood defects on longer beams, or 
specify smaller tolerances on the ground floor column. In reinforced concrete in 
particular, more test cubes should be taken for columns or shear walls (especially at 
lower floors) than for beams or slabs. Moreover, the uncertainty arising from human 
error can be decreased by assigning the more critical members to better qualified 
workers with more frequent direct supervision. 




This chapter describes the current treatment of structural design by limit state codes. It 
highlights the need for more in-depth thinking of whole structure safety. 
 
LRFD should not be perceived as a tool of to optimise design. It is an organisational 
platform that serves three purposes: to unify design practice, to provide measures for 
quality control and to provide a space that allows systematic improvement to the code 
with the arrival of new knowledge. 
 
Until formal risk-based guidelines evolve, designers should take note of the following 
recommendations: 
 
 It must be remembered that Limit State or LRFD codes are based on reliability 
which relates to probability of failure but not its consequence. The mode and 
result of failure are implicitly taken into account but only at the member level. 
Designers should give thought to the risk associated with failure and put in 
place ad-hoc mitigation measures. 
 
 Thought must be given to the overall structural system. Well-designed 
structures are resilient. They have sufficient redundancy to confine the effects 
of localised failures and adapt to damage. 
 
 Series systems such as columns in multi-storey buildings or bracing are more 
susceptible to disproportionate collapse than parallel systems. They should be 
optimised as much as possible, and redundancy should be provided by parallel 
components. Connections should be designed to withstand localised damage 
and redistribute the load to undamaged members. 
 
 Designs should be optimised as much as practically possible. Increasing 
member sizes might have the opposite effect on whole structure safety. If 
upgrade is necessary, it should be done consistently and proportionately 
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throughout: connections as well as beams, foundations with columns, etc. 
Conditions where member capacity is higher than its connections can lead to 
catastrophic failures. Therefore, a minimum capacity for connections equal to 
the maximum capacity of the upgraded member should be maintained.  Case 3 
in reference [90] is quite insightful. An upgrade can be as much a malignant 
overdose as a benign act of generosity. 
 
 Reducing uncertainty is key to increasing safety. Quality control procedures 










Strength Loss Method 
 
 
“Have you heard of the wonderful one-hoss shay, 
That was built in such a logical way, 
It ran a hundred years to a day, 
And then, of a sudden, it-ah, but stay, 
…………………………… 
Now in building of chaises, I tell you what, 
There is always somewhere a weaker spot, 
……………………… 
And that’s the reason beyond a doubt, 
A chaise breaks down, but doesn’ t wear out, 
………………………….. 
…………………. 
But the Deacon swore (as Deacons do), 
……………………… 
It should be so built that it couldn’ t break daown, 
“ Fur,”  said the Deacon, ‘ “ t’ s mighty plain 
Thut the weakes’  place mus’  stan’  the strain; 
‘N’  the way t’  fix it, uz I maintain, 
Is only jest 
T’  make that place uz strong uz the rest.’ ”  
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  ………………….. 
…………. 
First of November, the Earthquake day, 
There are traces of age in the one-hoss shay, 
A general flavor of mild decay, 
But nothing local, as one may say, 
There couldn’ t be, - for the Deacon’s art 
Had made it so like in every part 
………………………. 
First of November, ‘Fifty-five’ ! 
This morning the parson takes a drive. 
………………………….. 
……………………… 
The parson was working his Sunday text, 
Had got to fifthly and stopped perplexed 
……………………. 
- First a shiver, and then a thrill, 
Then something decidedly like a spill, - 
………………… 
What do you think the parson found, 
When he got up and stared around? 
The poor old chaise in a heap of mound, 
As if it had been to the mill and ground! 
You see, of course, if you’ re not a dunce, 
How it went to pieces all at once, - 
All at once, and nothing first, - 
Just as bubbles do when they burst. 
End of the wonderful one-hoss shay, 
Logic is logic. That’s all I say.”  
 
In 1858, Oliver Wendel Holmes, Professor of Anatomy at Harvard Medical School, 
wrote the “one-hoss shay” , of which the above excerpts are taken [91]. Holmes 
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describes an imaginary piece of manufacturing genius that is designed to last one 
hundred years, exactly; then all parts fail, all at once. 
 
The one-hoss shay was a vehicle in its time. Crushable parts in today’s cars and trains 
and reduced steel beam section in seismic design can be viewed as realisations of 
Holmes’ “weak spots” . Another important feature of the one-hoss shay was the 
elimination of maintenance cost due to all the components failing simultaneously. The 
reduction of maintenance cost is a fundamental aim of reliability design in many 
modern engineering disciplines. 
 
The major advances in the automobile industry with regards to reliability and damage 
control are not paralleled in structural engineering. Unlike structures, vehicles are 
built in batches that follow rigorous refinements to prototypes [49]. A series of tests to 
extreme conditions is applied before a model is released for production. 
 
Structural engineers do not enjoy the same luxury. Car design and manufacturing are 
strictly controlled by manufacturers. In contrast, building design is the result of an 
architectural embodiment of a personal vision, and the relationship between people 
and buildings is far more intimate. Full scale tests are neither inexpensive, nor 
conclusive due to the variety of architectural designs. 
 
The global departure to PBD codes necessitates the use of compatible quantitative risk 
assessment. The failure of individual members should be mapped to the global 
structure, so that the relative importance of various members to the overall structural 
stability is properly represented. Consequence indices that can be integrated with 
probabilities to produce the risk metric are fundamental ingredients in performance-
based design. 
 
The consequence of failure in present codes is not treated as an integral part of risk 
assessment, but implicitly in the varying reliability indices for different failure modes. 
This is partly due to member-based design approach adopted by the codes which 
intrinsically lacks the ability to assess the relative importance of members in the 
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parent structure. The code treatment for failure is confined to the almost generally 
prescriptive rules for the prevention of disproportionate collapse. This is described in 
more detail in the following section. 
 
The implementation of performance-based design requires the elevation of today’s 
reliability-based codes to risk-based codes. Risk evaluation forms a basic part of 
decision making in a performance-based project. The missing ingredient is a 
quantitative damage or loss parameter that can be integrated with the probability of 
failure to produce risk. 
 
This chapter is devoted to the treatment of structural damage. The Strength Loss 




6.1 Structural Engineering Approaches to Prevention of Disproportionate 
Collapse 
 
The design to mitigate disproportionate collapse is a basic requirement of building 
codes and regulations. Many national codes stipulate generic analyses to ensure that 
potential collapse remains at a comparable scale to the cause of damage. Great 
emphasis is placed on ensuring redundancy in addition to recommendations for 
connection design to resist the load redistribution that follows damage [92]. 
 
In 2011, a comprehensive research of existing methods for structural robustness and 
prevention of disproportionate collapse was commissioned by the UK Department of 
Communities and Local Government – Centre for the protection of National 
Infrastructure [93]. The report provides an extensive review of building code 
requirements for robustness in the UK, Europe, the USA and Canada. 
 
Following is a brief description of some popular approaches to structural robustness. 
More details are available in references [92, 93]. 




Prescriptive rules for structural robustness are the most popular methods in practice. 
They are simple, quick and as a result quite inexpensive. Two common approaches 
are tie-force design and key element design methods [92, 93]. Tie-force design is 
based on specifying a minimum tensile capacity for connections to ensure that 
catenary action can take place on the onset of a column removal. As a result of 
specifying the connection capacity, this method is restricted to buildings with a 
maximum of five storeys in the UK [92]. Structural members whose risk of removal 
exceeds certain limits are designed as key elements. In the UK, such members are 
required to resist a 34 kN/m2 pressure applied in any direction.  
 
More advanced techniques, such as alternative load-path methods, focus on the 
dynamic response of the structure upon the sudden loss of a member or sudden 
application of load. These employ dynamic analysis following a scenario-dependent 
and scenario-independent approach. When the hazard that initiates damage (the 
scenario) is not modelled, the analysis is called scenario-independent. This is the more 
popular option, where the effect of removing a member, for example, is modelled by 
applying its loads suddenly to the structure. Scenario-dependent methods on the other 
hand, use the specific hazard to evaluate the damage caused to the structure. 
 
Performance-based rules concern certain classes of buildings and involve the use of 
risk-based methods. The building classes relate to the number of people at risk in the 
event of collapse, and include buildings over 15 storeys high or grandstands 
accommodating more that 5000 spectators [92]. These methods require a probability-
based analysis of the hazard and its consequence, but are not currently used in the 
main body of codes and standards [93]. 
 
The application of risk-based methods requires the use of damage indices that can be 
integrated with the probability of occurrence in the risk metric. Some damage 
assessment models are reviewed in the following sections. 
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6.2 Existing Damage Assessment Models 
 
Damage models fall in two main categories: empirical and analytical. The common 
purpose of the two approaches is the development of a “value”  parameter that can be 
applied within a life-cost model. 
 
6.2.1 Empirical damage Models 
 
The focus of experimental investigation has been existing structures. Some examples 
are given below and more details can be found in reference [94]. 
 
A point system was used to grade buildings in Long Beach, California in 1971. Points 
are assigned to different features of each building. These include: Framing system, 
Bracing system, Partition, Special hazards such as un-reinforced masonry, and the 
Physical condition (signs of deterioration such as bowing or cracking). The total 
points are algebraically summed to produce a damage index. 
 
Other methodologies were adopted to evaluate the relative damage resulting from 













i FD    (6.1) 
 
 
in which, ∆i is the calculated inter-storey drift of the i th storey, (∆y)i is the inter-storey 
drift of the i th storey at yielding and F is a distribution function. 
 
The cumulative damage in structures was described by a number of researchers [94]. 
In seismic structures, the following expression was proposed: 
 
 











1    (6.2) 
 
 
where Z is the maximum displacement response, y is the yield displacement, and ai 
















































Another model was developed for the damage resulting from a predefined series of 






























−+= 1   (6.3-a) 
 
In the above expressions,  
 
wik: cumulative importance factor for the i
th member and event k 
dik: local damage index, element i and event k 
dij: local damage index, element i and events j < k 
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Z: demand in terms of displacement or other parameters 
c: capacity in units consistent with demand 
y: threshold f or limit state, such as yielding. 
 
In another research, laboratory test data was analysed for arbitrarily defined damage 
states [94]. The damage states were for example: yielded, cracked or failed. The 
variations of the threshold values of damage states were described using normal or 
lognormal distributions. They defined a “central damage factor” , γ as the ratio of the 
estimated repair cost to the replacement cost of an element. The expected damage was 
thus calculated as: 
 
)()( vDPDE i∑= γ    (6.4) 
 
where P(Di|v) is the conditional probability of damage state Di given demand v. 
 
 
6.2.2 Analytical damage Models 
 
The adoption of performance-based design in earthquake engineering resulted in an 
increase of research activity towards the definition of damage indices. The Pacific 
Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER) methodology was a precursor to the 
development of some damage indices [30, 95].  
 
PEER’s formula is a description of the probable damage associated with one event 
“or”  another. The “ or”  operator becomes a summation of probabilities which is 
generalised into the multidimensional integral in the formula, shown below [30]: 
 
 
( )IMdIMEDPdGEDPDMdGDMDVGDVv λ∫∫∫=)(    (6.5) 
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In the above, DV is a Decision Variable (failure, loss), DM is a Damage Measure 
(e.g.; repair), IM is an Intensity Measure (spectral acceleration) and EDP is an 
Engineering Demand Parameter (such as inter-storey drift, buckling load or stiffness). 
The left side of the equation, v(DV) is the probability of DV, which could be the 
probability of failure, Pf, or that of loss, P-loss. Equation 6.5 is a representation of an 
event tree of all probable events (hazards). It simply reads: the probability of loss 
(risk) is the probability of all possible hazards with intensity IM, causing an EDP 
(buckling load), that results in a DM (repair). 
 
Damage indices are the different parameters suitable for representing EDP. Some 
examples are presented below. 
 
One proposal for the damage index, EDP, was the eigenvalue buckling load factor, λcr 
[30]. The corresponding probability of failure is calculated as: 
 
)1( <= crf PP λ    (6.6) 
 
The above method is computationally efficient and the choice of the buckling load is 
appropriate when stability is the main consideration. The authors [30] however 
acknowledge the limitation of linear buckling analysis used in the method. 
 
Disproportionate collapse becomes “disproportionate”  when indirect risks contribute 
significantly to the system risk. For example, failure of five floors (indirect risk) that 
follows the failure of a column on another floor (direct risk) is disproportionate.  An 
index of robustness, IRob, was defined as the ratio of the system direct risk to the total 








=    (6.7) 
 
The index takes a value of 1 for a robust system with no indirect risk, and zero when 
all risks are indirect [95]. 
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6.3 The Strength Loss Method 
 
Under arbitrary external effects, P(t), at any point in time, t, P(t) is constant and equal 
to S(t)R(t), where S(t) is the strength matrix assembled from the structure tangent 
stiffness matrix (Thermo-elastic plastic matrix [96]), K T(t), the damping matrix, c(t) 
and the mass matrix, m(t),  
 
 
( ) ( ) )(ttt RSP =    (6.8) 
 
 
R(t) is a response vector formed by grouping the displacement vector, u(t) that 
includes thermally-induced displacements, the velocity vector, u′(t), and the 
acceleration vector, u″(t) . 
 
 











































































































































































At any point in time, t, under a specific design condition, P(t) is constant. Hence, 
 






1−= . Since I  R1 = R1, we have: 
 
2k1 RRR =  
 
Inversing both side yields: 
 




111 −−− = k21 RRR  
 
Multiplying both sides by R2: 
 
11 −− = k12 RIRR  
Inverse both sides, 
 
1−= 21k RRR    (6.9) 
 
 
The dot product of R1 and R2
-1 is achieved by transposing R2
-1 and pre-multiplying by 
R1 and taking the trace of R1 and R2
-1, tr(R1 R2
-1), which is equal to tr(R2
-1 R1). 
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Therefore, the product, R1 R2
-1, is a 1x1 matrix, the trace of which is a single value, 
Rk. 
 
)( 1−= 21RRtrRk    (6.9-a) 
 
 
If R1 is associated with an initial state of the system, and R2 with a subsequent state as 
affected by an additional load or a decrease of strength, then Rk would range from 
zero to unity, where unity signifies no loss of strength and zero total collapse. 
 
The damage can be defined as the ratio of the remaining (post-event) strength to the 




1 SSS −= −DSL           (6.10) 
 
 
Using equation (6.9), equation (6.10) becomes: 
 
 
kRDSL −= 1            (6.11) 
 
The calculation of the strength loss ratio, DSL, revolves around calculating an inverse 
for vector R2. The concept of inverse for a scalar quantity can be illustrated in Figure 
6.1.  





It is possible to obtain the same area, A, using b with more than one value of a, if b 
and a were associated with direction cosines. 
 
 
One can conclude that there exist an infinite number of (inverse) vectors, ai, whose 





A = ||b||||ai||cosθi = 1 







Figure 6.1:  Inverse of scalar b 
b 
a =b-1 if Area, A = ab = 1 
Area, A a 
 








1=            (6.12) 
 
Defining η as the vector of direction cosines for a and b (being co-linear), vector a 




1=            (6.13) 
 
 
But η is the unit vector of direction cosines for b, which can be written as: 
 
ai =b








Figure 6.3:  (Inverse) vectors for vector b 





η =            (6.13-a) 
 





a =            (6.13-b) 
 
Since a and b are co-linear, their dot product is determined as: 
 
1( ==• b)aba Ttr           (6.14) 
 








=−            (6.15) 
 
 
It is important to reiterate that b-1 in not a unique inverse to b. There is an infinite 
number of inverses for any vector, hence the common convention that vectors cannot 
be inversed. Vector a is however the only inverse that coincides with b. The reason 
for selecting this specific vector in calculating Rk is as follows. The calculation of Rk 
reflects the relative change in the “magnitude”  of response parameters at their 
respective degrees of freedom. To enable a valid comparison of the individual pre-
event and post-event response parameters, both response vectors must have the same 
direction cosines; hence the choice of a co-linear inverse vector. 
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The inverse vector in the above is similar in concept to reciprocal vectors used in 
crystallography [66]. The use of the term vector “ inverse”  is probably better 
substituted by “vector reciprocal” . 
 
6.3.1 Application of the Strength Loss Method in Structural Design for Fire 
 
Understanding the way fire affects buildings is important for proper fire protection 
design. Unlike many design loads, such as wind or earthquake, fire has a local rather 
than global effect on the structure which must be considered when extrapolating wind 
or earthquake solutions to fire safety design. Moreover, the response of structure to 
fire is highly nonlinear, but the dynamic influence on mechanical stresses is generally 
negligible. Heating causes relatively slow degradation of material properties coupled 
with large deformations. As a result, equation (6.8) can be truncated to: 
 






a0 and b are co-linear 
 
For a0 , θ0 = 0 
⇒   





Figure 6.4:  Co-linear (Inverse) vector for vector b 




The Strength Loss ratio, DSL, can then be expressed as: 
 







               (6.17) 
 




6.3.2 Tips for Calculating the Strength Loss ratio, DSL 
 
6.3.2.1 Choice of Degrees of Freedom 
 
The choice of degrees of freedom for structural analysis is arbitrary. The structure can 
be solved as long as the number of independent DOF’s is at least equal to the degrees 
of kinematic indeterminancy. For convenience, the degrees of freedom, DOF’s, at the 
junctions of members are typically used. Coordinates of the junctions have to be input 
to define the geometry, and as a result, it is easier to define the degrees of freedom 
and boundary conditions at these coordinates. It also simplifies the definition of 
constitutive relations and computer programming. 
 
In calculating the strength loss ratio, DSL, one is essentially dealing with the output of 
the structural analysis. It is therefore not necessary to restrict the number of 
deformations in the response vectors, u1 and u2, to those defining the degrees of 
freedom. Such procedure is not necessary and can sometimes lead to misleading DSL 
values. The beam in Figure 6.5 can be defined using the DOF’s at points A, B and C. 
When the deflections at A, B and C are used to calculate DSL, the resulting DSL is 1 
(total collapse), since the relative change in deflection at B is equal to infinity ((uB2 –
uB1)/uB1, uB1 = 0). This is incorrect as the support displacement does not necessarily 
indicate collapse. 




In Figure 6.5-a, DSL for the same above beam is calculated with different components 
of response vectors. The calculated DSL in this case is more accurate as it captures 
more points on the profile of the beam. 
 
 
Figure 6.5-a: Strength Loss for a two-span Beam 
(Set 2 of u1 and u2) 
B 
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Figure 6.5: Strength Loss for a two-span Beam  
(Set 1 of u1 and u2) 
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The above calculations are estimates of DSL. Strictly speaking, the precise value 
of DSL can only be calculated if points at infinitesimally small increments along the 
entire profile of the structure are used.  
 
6.3.2.2 Calculation of the Strength Loss ratio, DSL 
 
In some cases, the structure can deform in a way that the deformations cancel each 




The direct calculation of Rk from equation (6.17) would indicate zero damage. This 
situation is circumvented by taking the “square root of the square of u1 and u2 
components”  in calculating Rk. For example, 
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This procedure was used in calculating Rk for the example in the next section. 
 
Figure 6.6: Strength Loss for a Beam with an 
Applied Central Moment 




22 BA uu −=




A section in simple structure of a multi-storey building is depicted in Figure 6.7 [7]. It 
consists of a line of columns connected to a stiff inner core by 12m composite beams. 
The structure was subjected to a standard time-dependent temperature curve, 
representing a severe fire scenario at the fifth, sixth and seventh floor. The material 
properties for steel and concrete are nonlinear and are functions of the temperature 
evolution. The beams are analysed without passive fire protection and are subjected to 
a maximum temperature of 800 °C. The columns are assumed to have passive fire 
protection whose influenced is modelled by limiting the maximum temperature to 400 
°C. The analysis was performed using the general-purpose finite element programme, 




The displacements resulting from temperature rise are used to calculate the strength 
loss ratio at different time increments. The evolution of strength loss with time is 
shown in Figure-6.8, and Figure-6.9 shows the relative change of the strength loss 
ratio with respect to time. 
 
Figure 6.7: Plan & Section of the Structural Model 
(Reproduced from reference [7]) 







Figure 6.9: Change in Strength Loss with respect to Time 
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The zone in the region of 400 seconds signifies the maximum rate of strength loss, 
which can be a sign of runaway behaviour. After the 1000th second, the structure 
undergoes a transition into a new load-carrying mechanism, as indicated by a near 
constant rate of strength loss. 
 
6.4 Application of Strength Loss Method in Per formance-Based Design 
 
Logical design apportions risk uniformly to the elements of a structure, and structural 
members are proportioned to ensure a consistent consequence of failure. 
 
A proposal for the expected total cost of the structure was given in equation (4.25-a) 
in chapter 4 as: 
 
( ) iiTii RDIL i +−Φ+= β  
 
The above can be rewritten as: 
 
iifTii RDPIL ++=     (6.18) 
 
where PfT is the target (acceptable) probability of failure. 
 
The strength loss ratio, DSL, can be used as the damage index, Di, in the above 
formula. 
 
For a multi-storey building, the probability of fire occurrence is equal for all 
compartments of similar fire-pertinent conditions. That is P(Fire 1) = P(Fire 2) = … = 
P(Fire i), where i is the index describing the location of the compartment. 





Under any number of credible fire scenarios, the total cost, Li, should be kept 
constant. Suppose that the strength loss ratio, DSL, was calculated for two example 
scenarios, Fire 1 and Fire 2 say, as DSL-Fire 1 and DSL-Fire 2. The total cost 
corresponding to Fire 1 is calculated as: 
 
  2111 RDSLPIL FirefT ++= −   
 
    
 
For Fire 2, L2 is: 
  
 2222 RDSLPIL FirefT ++= −  
 
For a constant cost (or risk), 
 
21 LL =  
 








222111 RDSLPIRDSLPI FirefTFirefT ++=++ −−  
 
The above equation can be written as: 
 
)()()( 212211 FireFirefT DSLDSLPRIRI −− −=+−+  
  
 
Defining the initial and running cost, CIR, as CIR = I + R, the above equation can be 
generalised as: 
 
DSLPC fTIR ∆=∆    (6.19) 
 
Understanding the way fire affects buildings is important for proper fire protection 
design. Fire action is fundamentally different from other design loads, such as wind or 
earthquake, since its effect can be alleviated by active and passive fire protection 
systems. Different fire safety options have different initial and running cost. Statistics 
for the probability of failure of fire safety systems (alarms, sprinklers, passive fire 
protection) is also available. Finally, the calculated damage (DSL) can be reduced by 
enhancing the structural strength. It is therefore possible to vary the parameters in 
equation (6.19) to compare different fire safety options while keeping the risk 
constant. 
 
Suppose that sprinklers with passive fire protection were used for Fire 1 compartment, 
with a combined probability of failure of PF1. Sprinklers may then be excluded from 
Fire 2 compartment if the following condition is met: 
 
22F11F21 FireFireIRIR DSLPDSLPCC −− −=−  
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where PF2 is the probability of failure of fire protection systems without 
sprinklers, and DSL-Fire 1 and DSL-Fire 2 are the strength loss rations for compartment 1 
(with sprinklers), and compartment 2 (without sprinklers). 
 
The risk associated with multiple floor fires can be assessed in a similar manner by 
taking the probability of fire progressing to other floors. Details of calculating the 




The application of risk in performance-based design requires the use of a damage (or 
loss) index coupled with the probability of hazard under consideration. A number of 
existing empirical and analytical damage models were reviewed in this chapter. 
 
PEER’s formula yields the expected risk to a facility under a multitude of probable 
actions. It takes as such a passive approach to risk assessment, providing the client 
with the expected risk to any candidate design. Different designs may have different 
risks. 
 
The proposed PBD design procedure in section 2.14.2 (chapter 2) for optimising the 
life-cycle-cost (LCC) on the other hand, is an active method of calculating the 
optimum LCC for different designs under the constraint of equal risk. The client thus 
gets a number of design options, all carrying the same risk. 
 
Whether PEER’s criterion or LCC optimised criterion is used, the strength loss ratio, 





















The development of performance-based techniques promises revolutionary changes to 
the fire safety profession. The pursuit of rational fire safety solutions provided great 
momentum of fire engineering research in the past two decades. 
 
The main purpose of engineering is to provide service to society. The link between 
engineering codes and societal preferences are often buried under an array of complex 
legal and scientific regulations. 
 
This thesis emphasises the importance of implementing societal considerations in 
design using rational objective-based engineering methodologies.  
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As a plan for a predicted process, design is surrounded by an amalgam of 
uncertainties that invariably result in risk. A review of the impact of uncertainty on 
risk and the decision process has been presented. 
 
Modern structural design codes are based on reliability. The codes are designed using 
probabilistic techniques and are aimed at ensuring minimum safety indices. The 
consequence of events is not considered in current limit state codes; hence the 
associated risk is not evaluated.  
 
Risk-based methods are becoming increasingly popular to the ability of providing risk 
indices that facilitate informed decision making. The risk metric is a function of the 
probability and consequence of a hazard. Hence it is necessary to integrate a damage 
or loss parameter with probability to arrive a risk index. A review of some existing 
empirical and analytical damage indices was made, and a new damage index was 
proposed. 
 
There exist many opportunities for future research activities that might benefit from 
the large volume of existing fire safety knowledge. Some ideas are proposed in the 
following sections. 
 
7.1 Level I  L imit State/LRFD Structural Design Code 
 
It is important to acknowledge the need of design methods in LSD/LRFD formats. A 
wide range of design codes contain recommendations for structural design in fire, but 
are limited to individual member design. 
 
The aim of this proposal is to enable fire effects to be included in the linear 
LSD/LRFD load combinations. 
As detailed in section 4.7.3 of chapter 4, a safety function can be defined as the 
difference between limit state and actual steel temperature. (Equation 4.22) 
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 actualsteeliting TTg −−= lim)(x    
 
The limit state conditions define the maximum acceptable limits of deformations, 
which are the values that permit egress and evacuation. These limits cannot be 
generalised to all structures. However, it might be possible to develop general rules by 
defining a table of building classes and taking into account the factors that influence 
fire development. 
 
The load and resistance factors may be calculated by identifying the stress level that 
corresponds to corresponding to the limit state and actual steel temperatures.  
 
 
The LSD/LRFD codes can be extended to permit the inclusion of pertinent design 
factors, such as member dimensions and boundary conditions, heating regime and 
fire-pertinent factors such as the ventilation ratio. A nomogram similar to that used by 
AISC [97] in column design seems to be a good candidate. The influence of the 
constituent factors may then be developed deterministically and probabilistically on 
an individual basis, and the code can be refined with the build-up of new information.  
 
In figure 7.1, the terms demand and capacity (rather than load and resistance) are 
intentionally used to highlight the possibility of applying the concept to traditional 
load-strength check or for more comprehensive total fire protection system design.  




7.2 Structural Fire Reliability Calculation Programme, FiRel 
 
FiRel is a proposed computer programme for reliability calculation for structural 
performance in fire using response surface modelling. 
 
The programme is designed to analyse specific building classes by including factors 
that describe spatial properties, connection rigidity, floor restraint, ventilation factors, 
etc. 
 
The programme is linked to a finite element code where a small number of analyses 
are made for selected fire scenarios. The strength loss ratio can then be calculated for 
the different scenarios, and a suitable (building-specific) probability distribution 
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index based on the difference between the expected and acceptable values of the 
strength loss ratio. 
 
)()( DSLEDSLg acceptable −=⋅  
 
The acceptable strength loss ratio is specific to the building or building class and is 
defined as the value corresponding to the deformation limit that allows emergency 




7.3 A Simple Method for Assessing Structural Safety from Fire following 
Earthquake 
 
Fire following earthquake can cause large fatalities and severe losses to properties and 
infrastructure. It is the subject of a current collaborative research between the 
University of Edinburgh and the Indian Institute of Science. 
 
Statistics exist for the probability of coincidence of fire and earthquake, such as those 
cited in reference [13]. The strength loss ratio, DSL, proposed in chapter 6 is 
calculated from the remaining strength ratio, Rk. The probability of failure may be 
defined as the probability of the remaining strength after earthquake being less than 
what is required for performance in fire. This is represented by: 
 
)()( Fkkf TRERPEFP −<=  
 
The target remaining strength for fire, RkT-F, is “pre-calculated”  as the value 
corresponding to the maximum deformations that do not inhibit emergency operations 
nor lead to a total structural collapse. 
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7.4 Development of the Proposed Optimisation Technique for Calculating the 
Reliability Index 
 
A technique for calculating the reliability index was presented in section 4.10 of 
chapter 4. The method is conceptually simple but no application was made since it 
falls beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Validation is planned using example application with verification by established 
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